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Tax dispute resolution is essential to any tax system. A tax dispute can be said to occur when 
the tax authority and the taxpayer have divergent views on the taxpayer's liability. The 
divergence in views often emerges from the perceptions that both parties have that the other 
party has not correctly applied the law. Resolution of tax disputes through adversarial means 
such as litigation is often considered the worst-case scenario for parties in a tax dispute. 
Litigation is often costly and time consuming for both the tax authority and the taxpayer. 
Furthermore, litigation of tax disputes can lead to delays in revenue collection, financial 
difficulties for businesses and less compliance. The adverse effects of resolving tax disputes 
through litigation have led tax authorities to turn towards Alternative Dispute Resolution 
procedures (ADR procedures) that are less adversarial such as negotiated settlement, mediation 
and facilitated discussion. 
The use of ADR procedures in resolving tax disputes promises decreased costs, faster 
resolution, enhanced relationships between the tax authority and the taxpayer and enhanced 
voluntary compliance. Although there is a desire to use less adversarial means of dispute 
resolution to resolve a majority of tax disputes, use of out of court settlement procedure under 
the Tax Procedures Act, 2015 and the Tax Tribunal Act and the internal Alternative Dispute 
Resolution framework, the use of less adversarial means to resolve tax disputes remains low. 
Dispute Systems Design (DSD) as proposed by Ury, Brett and Goldberg seeks to design dispute 
resolution systems that are oriented towards a majority of disputes being resolved through less 
adversarial means which focus on the interest of the parties. DSD involves the intentional and 
systematic creation of procedures for handling disputes in a manner that promises lower costs, 
more satisfying outcomes and enhanced relationships. Ury, Brett and Goldberg propose six 
principles that can act as criteria for determining whether a dispute system is oriented towards 
resolving disputes by less adversarial means and the dispute system cuts the cost of disputing 
and achieves the gains promised by DSD. 
This study evaluates Kenya's tax dispute system through the six DSD principles proposed by 
Ury, Brett and Goldberg to identify any shortcomings in the design of Kenya's tax dispute 
resolution system that may hinder the resolution of a majority of tax disputes through less 
adversarial means. The methodological approach adopted in this study was a review of the 
relevant literature on Kenya's tax dispute system, DSD and the six DSD principles proposed 
by Ury, Brett and Goldberg. The study finds that Kenya's tax dispute resolution system does 
 
iv 
not meet four of the six principles proposed by Ury Brett and Goldberg and as such is not 
oriented towards a majority of tax disputes being resolved by less adversarial means such as 
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  Background of the Problem 
Taxation is the largest source of government revenue in Kenya.1 Taxation inevitably requires 
individuals and corporations to involuntarily sacrifice portions of their property to the 
government in exchange for public goods and services.2 The relationship between taxation and 
the right to enjoy possession of one’s property is often considered antagonistic because taxation 
is prima facie interference with property rights.3 Furthermore, the need for narrow outcomes 
in compliance and enforcement makes tax laws inherently complex.4 The interference with 
property rights, coupled with the complexity of tax laws, tends to generate uncertainty and 
disagreements between the taxpayers and the tax authorities, especially concerning taxpayers’ 
liability or their entitlements. It is therefore proper to conclude that disputes are a common 
feature of tax systems.5 Institutions and procedures must, therefore, be put in place to deal with 
the uncertainty and disputes in a manner that is fair, efficient, convenient, and impartial, 
guaranteeing high-quality outcomes.6  
                                                 
1 Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya, Kenya Revenue Analysis 2010-2015: A Historical 
Perspective to Revenue Performance in Kenya, 2016, 2. 
2 Xu Y, ‘Tax dispute resolution, judiciary independence and property rights’, University of Chicago Law School 
2013 Summer Institute for Law and Economics, Chicago, 16 July 2013, 1.  
3 Baker P, 'Taxation and the European Convention on Human Rights' 4 British Tax Review, (2000), 211–377, 216. 
Interference with property rights is a major criticism advanced by academics in opposition to taxation going as 
far as equating it to forced labour and some crudely describing taxation as ‘theft’ or ‘robbery’ (See: Nozick R, 
Anarchy, state and utopia, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1974, 169 and Chodorov F, ‘Taxation is robbery’ in 
Chodorov F, Out of step: the autobiography of an individualist, Devin-Adair, New York, 1962, 216-239). 
4 Cabrillo F and Fitzpatrick, The economics of courts and litigation, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2008, 157. The 
ultimate advantage of such detail and the resulting complexity is the certainty. See: Stanley S S, ‘Complexity and 
the internal revenue code: the problem of the management of tax detail’, 34 Law and Contemporary Problems, 4 
(1969), 673-710, 697. 
5 Tran-Nam B and Walpole M, ‘Independent tax dispute resolution and social justice in Australia’, 35 University 
of South Wales Law Journal, 2 (2012), 470-500, 477. 
6 Wright H L, Hoiutte J V, Kerlan P and Johnstone J A, Comparative conflict resolution procedures in taxation: 
an analytic comparative study, University of Michigan Law School, 1968, Ann Arbour, 4.  
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Overall, the main objective of a tax dispute resolution system ought to be to ensure that disputes 
and uncertainty are resolved in a timely, fair, and efficient manner. The tax dispute resolution 
system should also be convenient for the taxpayer and guarantee impartial determinations of 
high quality. Kenya’s tax dispute system is largely adversarial in nature providing for tribunals 
and courts as the main way disputes may be resolved after an objection.7 Furthermore, despite 
the existence of an integrated tax dispute resolution system based on internal review and a 
statutory tribunal in the first instance, Ado notes that, in practice, there are taxpayers that still 
prefer to file disputes directly to court in the form of judicial review proceedings.8  
The increasing frequency and complexity of tax disputes is one of the main administrative and 
enforcement challenges facing many revenue bodies.9 While a certain volume of tax disputes 
are to be expected in every tax system, Kenya was at one point plagued with significant tax 
litigation; 61 percent of tax disputes were being resolved through litigation, locking up billions 
of shillings in the judicial system for an average of four years.10 In comparison, South Africa 
resolves only 34 percent of its tax disputes through litigation.11 As at March 2015, the Kenya 
Revenue Authority (KRA) was pursuing Ksh 34.5 Billion in various court cases. Delays in 
collecting revenue subject to litigation in courts are worsened by the significant backlog of 
cases in the judiciary.12 Both taxpayers and tax authorities often consider litigation of tax 
                                                 
7 Kashindi G A, ‘Tax dispute resolution in Kenya: viability including alternative dispute resolution mechanisms', 
Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2017, 4. See also: Ado M, ‘Transfer pricing disputes in Kenya: 
advance pricing agreements the way forward?', Unpublished LLM thesis, Lund University, 28 May 2015, 18. 
8 Ado M, ‘Transfer pricing disputes in Kenya’, 16. The Courts have been quick to emphasise that where a statute 
provides a remedy to parties (for example an appeal process such as the Tax Appeals Tribunal), the courts must 
restrain themselves from hearing the matter and first allow the relevant bodies or State organs to deal with the 
dispute. See: Republic v National Environmental Management Authority [2011] eKLR, Diana Kethi Kilonzo & 
another v Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 10 others [2013] eKLR, Secretary, County Service 
Board & another v Hulbhai Gedi Abdille [2017] eKLR, Kenya Revenue Authority, Commissioner of Customs 
Services and Julius Musyoki v Darasa Investments Limited Civil Appeal No. 24 of 2018. 
9 Stilwell D K, ‘Mediation of Canadian tax disputes’, Unpublished LLM thesis, University of Toronto, 2014, 1. 
10 Kenya Revenue Authority, Sixth Corporate Plan, 2015, 50. See also: Kenya Revenue Authority, Seventh 
corporate plan 2018/19-2020/21: revenue mobilisation through transformation, 2019, 37. 
11 Kenya Revenue Authority, Sixth Corporate Plan, 2015, 50. 
12 In the Financial Year 2016/2017 out of the 533,350 pending cases, 315,378 of them were considered backlog. 
See: The Judiciary of Kenya, State of the Judiciary and the administration of justice annual report 2016-2017, 
6ed, 2017, viii.  
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disputes the worst-case scenario due to its protracted nature.13 Litigation of tax disputes not 
only leads to delays in revenue collection, but it is also costly and time-consuming for both the 
tax authority and the taxpayer.14 Litigation of tax disputes between the tax authority and the 
taxpayer can be an unfavourable interaction with the taxpayer which can lead to less future 
compliance.15 Furthermore, litigation of tax disputes significantly contributes to uncertainty in 
the tax system and can lead to commercial difficulties for business which can deter investment 
from multinationals.16 Tax authorities of both developing and developed nations are thus 
turning their attention towards the incorporation of ADR in the tax dispute system.17 The use 
of less adversarial means of dispute resolution promises efficiency, enhanced trust, enhanced 
voluntary compliance and lower administration costs; hence, a global shift towards widespread 
adoption of ADR processes into tax dispute resolution system.18 
Unfortunately, steps by KRA to improve compliance and to achieve revenue targets have come 
across as aggressive, and this perceived aggression will undoubtedly lead to more disputes with 
taxpayers.19 Considering the fact that KRA is the principal agency tasked with the collection 
of revenue through taxation for financing public expenditure, such protracted tax litigation can 
harm public finances. The tax dispute resolution system is not only important because it 
determines outcomes, but it also affects taxpayers’ perceptions of those outcomes and their 
compliance attitudes.20 Therefore, as a tax dispute resolution system develops, it is critical to 
                                                 
13 Ernst & Young, Tax dispute resolution: a new chapter emerges, 2010, 4.  
14 Thuronyi V and Espejo I, How can an excessive volume of tax disputes be dealt with?, 4. 
15 Tran-Nam B and Walpole M, ‘Tax disputes, litigation costs and access to tax justice’,14 eJournal of Tax 
Research, 2 (2016), 319-336, 325. 
16 International Monetary Fund and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Tax Certainty, 
2017, 22. 
17 Thuronyi V and Espejo I, How can an excessive volume of tax disputes be dealt with?, 31. 
18 Ernst & Young, Tax dispute resolution: a new chapter emerges, 2010, 4. 
19 Mwiti L, ‘Taxman, World Bank disagree over collection targets’, Standard Digital, 22 December 
2017,  https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001263845/kra-clashes-with-world-bank-over-
revenue-targets on 5 May 2018. 
20 Mirrlees J and Institute for Fiscal Studies, Tax by design: the Mirrlees review, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2011, 33.  
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reconsider its efficacy continuously, and the efficiency of its design, to ensure that it meets its 
objectives and the stakeholders’ needs.21 
To minimise the cost of disputes, it is critical to focus on the interest of the parties through 
interest-based ADR processes such as negotiation, mediation and facilitated discussions when 
designing the system.22 William Ury, Jeanne Brett and Stephen B Goldberg (Ury, Brett and 
Goldberg) highlight that focusing on the interest of the parties through interest based ADR 
processes leads to lower transaction costs, higher satisfaction with the outcomes, enhanced 
relationships amongst the disputants and lower recurrence of disputes of the same type than 
use of rights based processes such as adjudication and litigation.23 Ury, Brett and Goldberg 
have set out six principles in Dispute Systems Design (DSD) through which transaction cost 
may be lowered, satisfaction with outcomes may be increased and relationships may be 
enhanced. The six principles are: 1) Creating ways for parties to reconcile their interests, 2) 
having loopbacks that encourage disputants to return to less adversarial procedures, 3) 
providing low-cost rights and ‘power-backups’, 4) preventing unnecessary conflict through 
notification, consultation and feedback, 5) arranging procedures set out for resolving disputes 
in a low to high cost sequence and 6) providing the necessary motivation, skills and resources 
to allow the system to work..24 DSD, the process of developing and strategically organising 
dispute resolution procedures and processes in a manner that promises to lower costs, promotes 
higher quality resolution, improves dispute management and provides a lens through which 
efficacy and efficiency in the design of the system may be considered.25  
Kenyan lawmakers and the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) have taken measures to 
modernise and improve tax dispute resolution in Kenya. Parliament enacted the Tax Appeals 
Tribunal Act (TATA) which creates the Tax Appeals Tribunal (TAT), an independent tribunal 
                                                 
21 Franck S D, ‘Integrating investment treaty conflict and dispute systems design’, 92 Minnesota Law Review 
(2007), 161-230, 163. 
22 McKenzie C, ‘Designing a dispute system across an entire industry’, 6 ADR bulletin, 1(2003), 16-20, 16. 
23 Smith S and Martinez J, ‘An analytic framework for dispute systems design’, 14 Harvard Negotiation Law 
Review, 1 (2009), 123-169, 128. 
24 See: Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved: designing systems to cut through the cost of 
conflict, Jossey Bass, San Francisco, 1988. 
25 Brett M J and Golberg S B, ‘Dispute systems design’, 1 Perspectives on Work, 1(1997), 53-55, 53. 
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to hear appeals filed against any tax decision made by the commissioner.26 The TAT replaces 
Local Committees established under various tax statutes as the primary appeal mechanism.27  
Parliament further enacted the Tax Procedures Act (TPA) which harmonizes the procedural 
rules that govern tax administration in Kenya.28 The TPA consolidates procedural provisions 
from the Income Tax Act (ITA)29, the Value Added Tax Act (VAT Act)30, the Kenya Revenue 
Authority Act31, and the Excise Duty Act.32 Besides consolidation and collation, the TPA seeks 
to simplify compliance and tax collection by the Kenya Revenue Authority and make the 
dispute resolution process more expedient.33 The TPA simplifies compliance and enhances 
collection by eliminating duplication; the TPA does this by incorporating the general 
provisions in the various tax acts into one act, removing redundant administrative provisions 
and streamlining requirements that had previously existed in different pieces of legislation.34 
Furthermore, the TPA provides for both public and private rulings which are intended to give 
the taxpayer greater clarity in conducting their affairs, enhance tax compliance and potentially 
reduce the number of tax disputes.35 The TPA also provides the option for parties to settle their 
disputes out of court once proceedings having been initiated in the tribunal or in court on appeal 
however this is subject to the approval of either the court or the tribunal.36  
At the administrative end, KRA on its end launched an internal Alternative Dispute Resolution 
framework (ADR framework). The ADR framework is internal and is not expressly provided 
for in the tax acts. There is inferred legal backing for the framework under section 55 of the 
                                                 
26 Section 3, Tax Appeals Tribunal Act (Act No. 40 of 2013). 
27 Section 41 and Section 42, Tax Appeals Tribunal Act (Act No. 40 of 2013) repeals Section 83 of the Income 
Tax Act (Cap. 470) which establishes an Appeal Tribunal. 
28 Preamble, Tax Procedure Act (Act No. 29 of 2015).  
29 Cap. 470 of the Laws of Kenya. 
30 Act No. 35 of 2013. 
31 Cap. 469 of the Laws of Kenya. 
32 Deloitte, The Tax Procedures Bill 2015 analysis: diving deep, 2015, 4. 
33 Deloitte, The Tax Procedures Bill 2015 analysis: diving deep, 2015, 4. 
34 South Africa Revenue Service, Short Guide to the Tax Administration Act, 2011 (Act No. 28 of 2011), 2014,  
4. 
35 Kashindi G A, ‘Tax dispute resolution in Kenya’, 4. 
36 Section 28 (1), Tax Procedure Act (Act No. 29 of 2015)-  “ Where a Court or the Tribunal permits the parties 
to settle a dispute out of Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, the settlement shall be made within ninety 
days from the date the Court or the Tribunal permits the settlement.” (Emphasis added).  
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TPA, section 28 of the TATA and Article 159 (2) of the constitution.37 However, it has been 
argued that these provisions do not give a clear backing for the framework.38 ‘Facilitated 
discussions’ is the primary dispute resolution mechanism under the framework.39 Facilitated 
discussion (also known as facilitated negotiation) is a process where parties, having identified 
the issues in controversy, negotiate an outcome with the assistance of a neutral third party 
known as a facilitator.40 The facilitator manages the process and assists the parties to reach an 
agreement in a fair, equitable, and expeditious manner.41 The facilitator does not advise, 
adjudicate, or determine the dispute.42 Through such a relationship-based mechanism, KRA 
intends to, increase transparency, establish the taxpayer’s trust, and therefore enhance 
compliance.43 The adoption of mechanisms that enhance the relationship between KRA and 
the taxpayer are in line with KRA's mission statement i.e. : "Building Trust through Facilitation 
so as to foster Compliance with Tax and Customs Legislation".44 The need to build trust 
between the tax authority and the taxpayer is emphasized because trust in the authority and fair 
interaction with the taxpayer has been recognized under theories such as the slippery slope 
framework as essential elements in fostering voluntary compliance.45 The shift towards 
building high trust between the taxpayer and the tax authority is guided by empirical evidence 
that high trust is related to voluntary compliance with tax laws.46 Furthermore, how a tax 
                                                 
37 It is inferred because section 55 of the TPA and section 55 of TATA both provide of out of Court and out of 
Tribunal settlement. However, the provisions above do not provide for any particular framework to guide the out 
of court or tribunal settlement.  
38 Kashindi G A, ‘Tax dispute resolution in Kenya’, 70. 
39 Preamble, Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015. 
40 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Dispute resolution terms: the use of terms in 
(alternative) dispute resolution, 2003, 4. 
41 Paragraph 12.0, Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015. 
42 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Dispute resolution terms, 7. 
43 Kenya Revenue Authority, Transcript of the Commissioner General’s speech on launch of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) framework, 2015, 1. 
44 Kenya Revenue Authority, Transcript of the Commissioner General’s speech on launch of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) framework, 1. 
45 Muehlbacher S and Kirchler E, ‘Tax compliance by trust and power of authorities’, 24 International Economic 
Journal, 4 (2010), 607-610, 609. For a discussion on the slippery slope framework of tax compliance and how 
trust in authorities interacts with tax compliance see: Kirchler E, Hoelzl E and Wahl I, ‘Enforced versus voluntary 
tax compliance: the “slippery slope” framework’, 29 Journal of economic psychology, (2008), 210-225. 
46 Kirchler E, Kogler C and Muehlbacher S, ‘Cooperative tax compliance: from deterrence to deference’, 23 
Current directions in psychological science, 2 (2014), 87-92, 89. See; Muehlbacher S, Kirchler E and 
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authority treats a taxpayer during an encounter can shift their beliefs and attitudes either 
positively or negatively.47 Positive and negative beliefs and attitudes ultimately determine the 
social distance that exists between the authority and the taxpayer and whether the taxpayer will 
be more compliant.48  
 Research Problem 
Kenya aspires to significantly reduce the number of tax disputes that are settled through 
litigation.49 To that effect, parliament has harmonised tax administration provisions and dispute 
resolution procedures; KRA has established an ADR framework and an independent tax 
tribunal has also been established. The tax dispute system established under the TPA, TATA, 
and KRA's ADR framework aims at ensuring that tax disputes are resolved in a timely and 
cost-effective manner which, in turn, will ensure efficient revenue collection, transparency, 
enhanced taxpayer satisfaction and improved taxpayer compliance. This paper is concerned 
with whether Kenya's tax dispute resolution system as set out in the TPA, TATA, East African 
Community Customs Management Act (EACCMA)50 and in KRA’s ADR framework are 
effectively designed to resolve tax disputes through less adversarial means. The thesis 
evaluates Kenya's tax dispute resolution system through the DSD principles proposed by Ury, 
Brett, and Goldberg to identify shortcomings in the design of the system that may hinder the 
resolution of tax disputes through less adversarial means.  
 Research Objectives 
1. Critically evaluate the design of Kenya’s tax dispute resolution system through the lens 
of the principles proposed by Ury, Brett and Goldberg. 
                                                 
Schwarzenberger, ‘Voluntary versus enforced compliance: empirical evidence for the “slippery slope” 
framework’, 32 European journal of law and economics, 2010, 89–97.  
47 Braithwaite V, ‘Dancing with tax authorities: motivational postures and non-compliant actions’ in Braithwaite 
V (ed), Taxing democracy, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2002, 15-40, 35. 
48 Braithwaite V, ‘Dancing with tax authorities: motivational postures and non-compliant actions’, 35. 
49 Kenya Revenue Authority, Sixth Corporate Plan, 2015, 50 
50 The East African Community Customs Management Act also sets out dispute resolution procedures in relation 
to customs disputes.  
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2. Make recommendations that address any identified shortcomings and propose 
improvements to the design of the tax dispute system to ensure that a majority of tax 
disputes is resolved through less adversarial means.  
 Hypothesis 
1. Kenya’s tax dispute resolution system is not designed to resolve a majority of tax 
disputes through less adversarial dispute resolution procedures such as settlement, 
negotiation and facilitated discussions thus hindering the system's primary objective of 
providing fair, timely, and cost-effective dispute resolution. 
2. Amending the TPA to provide for: compromise settlement of tax disputes, rules 
governing the use of ADR procedures, provision for a register of settlements and 
methods of reporting settlements reached between KRA and the taxpayer and 
mechanisms allowing the parties to loop back to ADR procedures at the appeal level 
all of which are based on the principles by Ury, Brett and Goldberg which would make 
the tax dispute system more oriented towards less adversarial dispute resolution. 
 Research Questions 
The study seeks to investigate two main questions:  
1. What is the current design of Kenya’s tax dispute resolution system?  
2. How does Kenya’s tax dispute resolution system, as currently designed, measure up to 
the design principles proposed by Ury, Brett and Goldberg?  
3. How can the design of Kenya’s tax dispute resolution system be improved, based on 
the design principles proposed by Ury, Brett and Goldberg, to ensure that a majority of 
tax disputes are resolved through less adversarial means?  
 Justification of the Study 
A fair, timely and cost-effective dispute resolution system is essential to a modern tax system 
that is primarily based on self-assessment.51 The design of a dispute resolution system has 
                                                 
51 Okello A, Managing income tax compliance through self-assessment, International Monetary Fund Working 
Papers, 2014, 35. 
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implications on the cost of revenue collection by the tax authority, tax morale52 and taxpayer 
compliance. Currently, only 39 percent of tax disputes are resolved under through ADR under 
KRA’s ADR framework against an intended target of 66 percent.53 The low rate of resolution 
of tax disputes under the ADR framework means some form litigation still resolves a vast 
majority of disputes either before the tax appeals tribunal or courts of law. It is against this 
background that KRA have sought to restructure and strengthen the ADR function.54 A system 
that primarily uses some form of litigation either before courts or tribunals is what Ury, Brett 
and Goldberg refer to as a distressed system. In distressed systems, disputes are resolved 
through determining who is right or through power contests rather than reconciling the interests 
of the parties.55 Rights-based approaches such as litigation are costlier in terms of time, money 
and resources expended than interest-based approaches such as negotiation, mediation and 
facilitated negotiation.56 The ultimate goal of DSD is to improve a dispute resolution system 
by encouraging and supporting the primary use of interest-based dispute resolution 
mechanisms and low-cost rights methods where necessary.57 Improvements to the dispute 
resolution system can be achieved by designing the dispute resolution system according to the 
six principles suggested by Ury, Brett and Goldberg.58 It is therefore imperative, based on the 
principles of DSD proposed by Ury, Brett and Goldberg, to critically analyse the design of the 
system and root out any shortcomings that may hinder the tax dispute resolution system from 
resolving a majority of its disputes through interest-based approaches to dispute resolution.  
While there have been numerous studies that have applied DSD principles in the analysis of 
tax dispute resolution systems, those studies have primarily focussed on dispute resolution 
                                                 
52 Luttmer and Singhal define tax morale as the "totality of non-pecuniary motivations and factors for tax 
compliance which fall outside the expected utility maximisation." See: Luttmer E F P and Singhal M, ‘Tax 
morale',  28 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4 (2014), 149-168, 153. 
53 Kenya Revenue Authority, Seventh corporate plan 2018/19-2020/21: revenue mobilisation through 
transformation, 2019, 37. 
54 Kenya Revenue Authority, Seventh corporate plan 2018/19-2020/21: revenue mobilisation through 
transformation, 2019, 37. 
55 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 18. 
56 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 13. 
57 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 18. 
58 Smith S and Martinez J, ‘An analytic framework for dispute systems design’, 128. 
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systems in developed countries such as the United Kingdom59, Australia60, New Zealand61, and 
the United States of America62. The proposed project will contribute to existing knowledge on 
DSD and tax dispute resolution by evaluating the tax dispute resolution system in Kenya, a 
developing country in the African continent. The project will in some instances draw from the 
literature and experiences in developed jurisdictions. 
 Theoretical Framework 
DSD, as conceptualised by Ury, Brett and Goldberg, is premised on three theoretical 
propositions.63 The first proposition is that there are three approaches to resolving disputes 
based on the outcome function of each dispute resolution approach namely, interest-based 
procedures, rights-based procedures and power-based procedures.64 The second proposition is 
that interest-based procedures are potentially more effective than rights-based procedures and 
that rights-based procedures are more effective than power based procedures.65 The third 
proposition is that dispute resolution costs may be reduced by creating ‘interest-oriented’ 
systems.66 Therefore, the overall goal is that most disputes are resolved through reconciling 
interest.67  
                                                 
59 Jone M, ‘What can the United Kingdom's tax dispute resolution system learn from Australia? An evaluation 
and recommendations from a dispute system design perspective’, 32 Australian Tax Forum, 1 (2017), 59-94. 
60 Bently D, ‘Problem resolution: does the ATO approach really work?’, 6 Revenue Law Journal, 1(1996), 17-42, 
Bently D, Taxpayers rights: theory, origin and implementation, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
2007, Mookhey S, ‘Tax dispute systems design’, 11 eJournal of Tax Research, 1(2013), 79-96, Jone M, 
‘Evaluating Australia’s tax dispute resolution system: a dispute systems design perspective’, 13 eJournal of Tax 
Research, 1 (2015), 552-580. 
61 Jone M, ‘Evaluating New Zealand’s tax dispute resolution system: a dispute systems design perspective’ 22 
New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy, 1 (2016), 228-258 and Jone M, ‘Tax dispute systems design: 
international comparisons and the development of guidance from a New Zealand Perspective’, Unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Canterbury, 30 November 2016. 
62 Jone M, ‘Tax dispute systems design’, 139-176. 
63 Wolski B, ‘The model dispute resolution procedure for Australian workplace agreements: a dispute system 
design perspective’, 10 Bond Law Review, 1(1998), 7-42, 13.   
64 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 6. 
65 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 14. 
66 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 16. 
67 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 18 
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From the three propositions, Ury, Brett and Goldberg formulate six fundamental principles to 
be applied in designing cost-efficient and interest-based dispute resolution procedures.68 These 
fundamental principles, collectively known as the ‘Ury, Brett and Goldberg Model’69 
The Ury, Brett and Goldberg model of DSD focuses on individual and matter-specific 
disputes.70 This model places the focus on disputes and dispute resolution mechanisms as used 
to resolve disputes compared to other comparable models which focus on conflict 
management.71 The model by Ury, Brett and Goldberg categorise the various means of 
resolving disputes and each of their consequences.72 Dispute resolution systems based on Ury, 
Brett, and Goldberg’s propositions thus focus on the processes and approaches that people use, 
rather than the disputes themselves. The model also meets the two main requirements of a 
practical and useful conflict analysis model: first, simplicity in diagnosis and providing 
strategic guidance.73 The model is simple in its diagnosis in that it proposes a single, detailed 
understanding of dispute resolution approaches and the costs and benefits associated with each 
approach. Second, the model also provides strategic guidance since the principles applied in 
DSD give directions that are practical and applicable to the practitioner.74  The researcher will 
use the fundamental design principles to evaluate the design of the Kenyan tax dispute 
resolution system; thus the Ury, Brett, and Goldberg model form the conceptual springboard 
of this thesis. Each of these propositions is discussed in detail.  
 There are three ways to resolve disputes 
1.7.1.1. Reconciling interests 
                                                 
68 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 6. 
69 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 42-60. 
70 Costantino C A and Merchant C S, Designing conflict management systems: a guide to creating productive and 
healthy organizations, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1996, 47. 
71 Furlong G T, The conflict resolution toolbox: models & maps for analysing, diagnosing and resolving conflict, 
John Wiley & Sons, Ontario, 2005, 20.  
72 Furlong G T, The conflict resolution toolbox, 20. 
73: Furlong G T, The conflict resolution toolbox, 109. 
74 Furlong G T, The conflict resolution toolbox, 12. 
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The interests of the parties are the needs, desires and concerns of the parties.75 The definition 
of ‘interests’ in this context is drawn from negotiation theory.76 An interest-based approach 
focuses on the underlying interests of the parties to produce solutions which satisfy as many of 
those interests as possible.77 Deep-seated concerns must be probed, creative solutions must be 
devised, and trade-offs must be made to satisfy as many interests as possible.78 Interest-based 
procedures afford the parties more control in the nature, direction and outcome of the 
processes.79 Interest-based methods indicate the underlying reason for the dispute and then 
using methods focused on this underlying principle to arrive at resolutions that are mutually 
acceptable and satisfactory.80 Mainly, they take into account all the parties' interests.81 There 
are two main interest-based dispute resolution methods; negotiation and mediation or 
facilitated discussions. These processes aim at producing a consensual settlement that 
accommodates the needs or interests of the parties. Often in tax disputes, the interests of the 
tax authority and the taxpayer subsumed and disregarded with more considerations being given 
to rights or exertions of power by the parties.82  
1.7.1.2. Determining who is right 
Rights-based approaches involve a determination of who is ‘right’ according to some 
independent and objective standard which is perceived as legitimate and fair.83 These objective 
and independent standards can be the terms of contract, custom, precedent or laws.84 Often 
‘rights' are not always clear and so the parties have to turn to a neutral third party to apply 
agreed-upon principles or rules to the set of facts to determine who among the parties is right.85 
Arbitration and litigation, which are both forms of adjudication, fall in this approach of dispute 
                                                 
75 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 5. 
76 Wolski B, ‘The model dispute resolution procedure for Australian workplace agreements’, 14. 
77 Fisher R and Ury W, Getting to yes: negotiating an agreement without giving in, Random House Business 
Books, 2 ed, 1991, 4. 
78 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 6. 
79 Furlong G T, The conflict resolution toolbox, 112. 
80 Costantino C A and Merchant C S, Designing conflict management systems, 45. 
81 Costantino C A and Merchant C S, Designing conflict management systems, 45. 
82 Jones M, ‘Tax dispute systems design’, 65. 
83 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 7. 
84 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 7. 
85 Ury W,  Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 7. 
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resolution. Any form of adjudication that involves an independent tribunal making a binding 
and legally enforceable determination of matters in dispute is considered a ‘rights’-based 
procedure.  
1.7.1.3. Determining who is more powerful 
Ury, Brett and Goldberg define power as ‘the ability to coerce someone to do something he 
would not otherwise do’.86 The use of power characterises power-based approaches and these 
approaches often involve an exchange of threats, acts of aggression, and the withholding of 
benefits that derive from a relationship.87 Ury, Brett and Goldberg note that the definition used 
is rather narrow.88 This concept of power where A has ‘power’ over B to the extent A can get 
B to do something that B would not otherwise do is considered a ‘one-dimensional’ view of 
power.89 It does make sense that this concept of power is used by Ury, Brett and Goldberg 
because this one-dimensional view of power  is most observable when there is a social conflict 
and the parties test their capacities to affect outcomes, one such situation being disputes.90 
Exercising power involves imposing a cost on the other side or threatening to do so.91  The 
party with the most leverage determines the outcome of the dispute.92 The obvious intent of 
these procedures is to coerce the other party to yield to terms that are more satisfactory to the 
party wielding power.93 In a distressed dispute resolution system, many disputes are solved 
through power.94 
 Interest-based approaches are best 
Interests, rights, and power procedures generate different costs and benefits.95 In comparing 
the approaches Ury, Brett and Goldberg focus on four criteria to determine which of the 
                                                 
86 Ury W,  Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 7.  
87 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 8. 
88 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 8. 
89 Lukes S, Power: a radical view, Palgrave Macmillian, London, 2ed, 2007, 16. 
90 Lukes S, Power: a radical view, 18. 
91 Ury W,  Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 8. 
92 Smith and Martinez, ‘An analytic framework for dispute systems design’, 128. 
93 Ury W,  Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved 
94 Costantino C A and Merchant C S, Designing conflict management systems, 45. 
95 Wolski B, ‘The model dispute resolution procedure for Australian workplace agreements’, 16. 
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approaches are better.96 ‘Better’ or ‘best’  is measured by reference to transactions costs, 
satisfaction with procedures and outcomes, long-term effect on the parties’ relationship, and 
recurrence of disputes.97 In this context, the transaction costs refer to time, money, resources 
consumed and destroyed, the emotional energy expended in disputing and the opportunities 
lost.98 Satisfaction with procedures depends on the perceived fairness of the procedures.99 The 
long-term effect on the parties' relationship refers to the ability of the two parties to work 
together in the future. 100 Recurrence of the dispute focuses on whether the resolution will last 
or whether similar disputes will arise.101 Ury, Brett and Goldberg propose that reconciling 
interests costs less and yields more satisfactory results than determining who is right, which in 
turn costs less and satisfies more than determining who is more powerful.102 Based on this 
proposition, the costs associated with dispute resolution would be reduced, and the benefits of 
disputing would be increased if all disputes were resolved primarily through interest-based 
procedures such as negotiation and mediation.103 However, it is neither possible nor desirable 
to resolve all disputes in this manner. Rights and power-based procedures may be necessary 
where the parties are unable or unwilling to use interest-based procedures.104 There are also 
several situations, such as in cases concerning a significant question of public policy, where a 
rights-based procedure such as litigation is mandated.105 Although reconciling interests is 
generally less costly than determining rights, rights-based procedures such as adjudication are 
the only procedures that can authoritatively resolve questions of public importance.106 
 The Goal: ‘Interests-oriented’ Dispute Resolution Systems 
Ury, Brett and Goldberg postulate that interest-based procedures have the potential to be the 
most cost-effective. They also recognise that rights and power-based procedures are necessary 
                                                 
96 Ury W,  Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 13. 
97 Ury W,  Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 11. 
98 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 11. 
99 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 12. 
100 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 12. 
101 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 12. 
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103 Wolski B, ‘The model dispute resolution procedure for Australian workplace agreements’, 16. 
104 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting Disputes Resolved, 16. 
105 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting Disputes Resolved, 17. 
106 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 18. 
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and desirable components of a dispute resolution system.107 In order to reduce the costs of 
handling disputes, dispute systems designers endeavour to create systems that are ‘interests-
oriented’, that is, systems that promote the resolution of disputes through use of interest-based 
procedures wherever possible but that also provide ‘low-cost ways to determine rights or power 
for those disputes that cannot or should not be resolved by focusing on interests alone’.108 To 
sum up, the overall prescription for improved dispute resolution is to encourage interest-based 
methods and then use low-cost rights-based methods where necessary.109 The goal of a designer 
is therefore to design a system where most disputes are resolved through reconciling 
interests.110  
 Criticisms of the Model 
Although this model is considered revolutionary, it has been subjected to some criticism111. 
First, the model takes a linear approach to dispute resolution systems, focusing on the processes 
and approaches for resolving matter specific and single disputes.112 While this first criticism is 
one of the aspects this model that was attractive for its use in this thesis, the model’s narrow 
approach to dispute systems does not address underlying systematic conflicts that traverse 
beyond the matter specific dispute between the parties.113 Furthermore, the model does not 
address issues such as individual responses to disputes as a result of culture; rather, it places a 
focus on the ‘interests’ of the parties in the specific dispute.114 The second criticism levelled 
against the model is that is does not place enough emphasis on the prevention of disputes as a 
necessary and essential aspect of the dispute resolution systems; the model revolves around the 
reconciliation of parties once a dispute has arisen.115 Despite the criticisms levied, the model 
has been used to pursue the research objectives because of its focus on dispute resolution 
procedures as a core part of any dispute system.   
                                                 
107 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 18. 
108 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 18. 
109 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 18. 
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113 Costantino C A and Merchant C S, Designing conflict management systems, 47. 
114 Costantino C A and Merchant C S, Designing conflict management systems, 47. 
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 Research Methodology and Approaches 
The author has adopted qualitative legal research methods for this thesis, i.e., the data 
underpinning the research is non numerical in contrast to quantitative research deals with 
numbers, statistics or hard data.116 This thesis employs three qualitative approaches in 
addressing the research problem. The first approach is the doctrinal approach which involves 
the descriptive exposition of legal rules.117 The purpose of this approach is to describe legal 
rules and offer commentary to give a complete statement on the law.118 The doctrinal approach 
is mostly library based, focusing on primarily materials such as legislation and case law.119  
The second approach utilized is the non-doctrinal approach. Non doctrinal legal research 
involves identifying a legal problem, analyzing the problem, and proposing changes to the 
law.120 This thesis employs a non-doctrinal approach by evaluating the existing legal 
framework to outline an existing problem and then suggesting changes to the law.121 The third 
approach used is a comparative approach which looks into “how different legal systems and 
legal cultures have addressed problems that our law faces but in a different way, and with what 
degree of perceived success or failure”.122 This approach is particularly useful as it enables a 
researcher to consider the desirability of certain legal features that have been successfully 
introduced in other jurisdictions as a response to an analogous issue.123 This thesis adopts a 
comparative approach by looking at some aspects of the tax dispute resolution procedures in 
other jurisdictions that have been more successful in utilizing non adversarial means of dispute 
resolution than Kenya. 
                                                 
116 Dobinson I and John N, ‘Qualitative legal research’ in McConville M and Chui W H (eds), Research methods 
for law, Edinburgh University Press, 2007, 16  - 45, 17.  
117 M Salter and Mason J, Writing law dissertations: An introduction and guide to the conduct of legal research, 
Pearson Education Limited, Essex, 2007, 49. 
118 Hutchinson T, ‘Doctrinal research’ in Watkins D and Burton M (eds), Research methods in law, Routledge, 
2013, 7 – 33, 9. 
119  Chui W H, ‘Quantitative legal research’, in McConville M and Chui W H (eds), Research methods for law, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2007, 46 – 68, 47. 
120 Dobinson I and John N, ‘Qualitative legal research’,  
121 M Salter and Mason J, Writing law dissertations,  183. 
122 M Salter and Mason J, Writing law dissertations, 183. 
123 M Salter and Mason J, Writing law dissertations, 183. 
 17 
The thesis commences with a review the literature on Kenya's tax dispute system, tax 
administration as well as Ury, Brett and Goldberg's DSD principles. Primary sources of data 
include the constitution of Kenya, the relevant acts of Parliament, secondary legislation and 
case law; these sources are essential as they delineate Kenya's economic system and tax dispute 
resolution system. Secondary sources of data, including books, online journal articles, theses, 
conference papers, and reports, will provide essential insight into tax administration and tax 
dispute resolution mechanisms and systems, as well as and Ury, Brett and Goldberg's dispute 
design principles. 
 Scope 
The thesis evaluates how Kenya’s tax dispute system measures up against the Ury, Brett and 
Goldberg principles of dispute systems design. The focus is on the efficiency of the design of 
the dispute system. The thesis does not analyse whether the dispute system is effective in 
resolving tax disputes. This thesis does not seek to redesign the entire system of resolving tax 
disputes; instead, it considers how good design principles can ensure that more tax disputes are 
resolved by less adversarial to achieve lower dispute resolution costs, higher quality resolution, 
greater legitimacy, and an enhanced tax authority-taxpayer relationship. Furthermore, while it 
is acknowledged that local culture plays a significant role in tax dispute resolution, and may 
have a significant effect on the implementation of the proposed model in Kenya, an analysis of 
the cultural implications and the need for a culture change within KRA is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
 Literature Review  
The aim of undertaking a literature review is to account and evaluate the available literature on 
dispute systems design in tax dispute resolution to inform this study. 
  Tax Dispute Resolution in Kenya 
Tran-Nam and Warpol note that a tax dispute occurs when a taxpayer takes a view contrary to 
that of the tax administrator with regards to their tax liabilities and entitlements and takes some 
course of action.124 Although the authors identify a broad category of tax disputes, including 
complaints against the commissioner, this thesis will be restricted to the resolution of tax 
                                                 
124 Tran-Nam and Walpole, ‘Independent tax dispute resolution and social justice in Australia’, 477. 
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disputes arising from the assessment of tax liability and subsequent objection by the 
taxpayer.125 In describing how tax disputes emerge and develop, Smith and Stanlas describe 
tax disputes as involving ‘Perceived Erroneous Applications of the Laws’ (PEALs) where both 
the tax authority and the taxpayer believe  that the other party has not applied the law correctly, 
leading to contrary views on tax liability and entitlement.126Gordon states that tax 
administration law should provide for a fair, timely, and efficient manner of resolving tax 
disputes.127 He goes on to state that it is preferable that a single method of resolving disputes 
from disagreement with an assessment up to the resolution of a final appeal.128  
In Kenya, the first course of action available to the taxpayer is an objection to the 
commissioner's decision under the TPA.129 Kashindi, while examining the viability of ADR as 
a mechanism in tax dispute resolution in Kenya, observes that historically, tax dispute 
resolution in Kenya has been mostly adversarial.130 Kashindi further notes Kenya’s legal 
framework only provides for adjudication before tribunals or the courts.131 According to the 
KRA Sixth Corporate Plan 2015-2018, the majority of tax disputes in Kenya are resolved 
through some form of adversarial dispute resolution.132 These processes are highly protracted, 
taking an average of 4 years to resolve disputes.133 This situation is not limited to the Courts; 
the TAT has been at times lethargic despite the ninety-day limit provided for under the 
TATA.134 A European Commission study observed that the main factors hindering effective 
resolution of tax disputes in Kenya include the adoption of an adversarial system of tax dispute 
resolution that focusses solely on winning, the backlog of cases in court, and the lack of 
                                                 
125 Tran-Nam and Walpole, ‘Independent tax dispute resolution and social justice in Australia’, 477. 
126 Smith W and Stalans L J, ‘Negotiating strategies for tax disputes: preferences of taxpayers and auditors’, 19 
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129 Section 51 (1), Tax Procedures Act, (Act No. 29 of 2015).  
130 Kashindi G A, ‘Tax dispute resolution in Kenya’, 36. 
131 Kashindi G A, ‘Tax dispute resolution in Kenya', 36.  
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specialist experience in tax committees and courts hindered the effective resolution of tax 
disputes in Kenya.135 According to Ado, despite the existence of a statutory appeal mechanism 
against the decisions of the commissioner, taxpayers still prefer to file their disputes directly 
to courts.136 The admission of such cases is then subsequently justified by the court's powers 
of judicial review.137 For example, in Republic v Commissioner of Income Tax Ex Parte SDV 
Transami (Kenya) Limited,138 a dispute over a decision by the commissioner of income tax to 
recover withholding tax payable, the court held that judicial review was an appropriate cause 
of action against the decision. Further in Keroche Industries v Kenya Revenue Authority & 5 
Others139 the Court held: 
“The respondents’ argument that the applicant came to court prematurely without 
exhausting the internal tax objection process as regards each category of tax, is a serious 
misdirection because as it has been stated elsewhere in this judgment the issues raised 
were greater than any of the internal tribunals could handle.  The task before the court 
is not, and has not been that of counting the shillings, it has been one of adjudicating on 
illegality, the doctrine of ultra vires, irrationality, procedural impropriety, Wednesbury 
unreasonabless, oppression, malice, bias, discrimination and abuse of power.” 
A common objection raised by KRA, apparent from case law in such disputes, is that the 
taxpayer ought not to access the courts before exhausting the appeal mechanisms provided in 
statutes such as the TPA and the TATA.140 However, Migai argues that tax litigation in the 
context of judicial review is not entirely unwarranted.141 Taxpayers are prompted to pursue 
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judicial review to seek relief from the courts as a result of KRA’s failure to issue tax assessment 
notices, give taxpayers proper hearings, and seek and enforce agency notices procedurally; the 
Authority also takes an inordinate amount of time to respond to objections and abuses its 
discretionary powers.142 Unfortunately, needless aggression by KRA owing to higher tax 
targets will only result in more frivolous cases. While litigation of tax disputes through judicial 
review is instrumental in ensuring accountability in tax administration, taxpayers have utilised 
it as a dilatory tactic.143 As has been noted though, the courts have been quick to emphasise 
that where statutory remedies have been provided, the courts must be reluctant in hearing the 
matters, and they must first give an opportunity to the relevant bodies or state organs to deal 
with the dispute. 
Thuronyi and Espejo state that excessive litigation can lead to delays in the collection of taxes 
and is costly for the taxpayer and the tax authority.144 Furthermore, in a study conducted by 
Worsham, he concluded that taxpayers who had indirectly had unfavourable experiences with 
the tax administrator were less likely to be compliant in future.145 Tran-Nam and Walpole also 
observe that excessive litigation costs can negatively impact social justice and can compromise 
effective access to independent tax dispute resolution.146 In a joint International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report on tax 
certainty, it was observed that issues associated with dispute resolution mechanisms, for 
example, lengthy dispute resolutions processes and unpredictability of the costs of litigation 
were likely to contribute to uncertainty.147 Furthermore, lingering and unresolved tax disputes 
cause commercial difficulties which may, in turn, deter investment.148 To this extent, Okello 
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concludes that fair and expeditious tax dispute resolution is essential to an effective self-
assessment system.149  
Thuronyi and Espejo make several recommendations to deal with excessive and protracted tax 
disputes: simplification of tax laws, organization of efficient appeals systems which 
incorporate ADR procedures, ensuring that tax administrations take a cooperative approach to 
taxpayers, specifying the law on administrative procedures, and taking administrative actions 
that lead to a greater culture of taxpayer compliance.150 ADR procedures are of particular 
importance in alleviating the problem of protracted tax disputes. ADR has been described as 
‘an umbrella term for processes, other than judicial determination, in which an impartial person 
assists those in dispute to resolve the issues between them’.151 Broadly, ADR encompasses 
non-judicial processes such as arbitration, conciliation, mediation, negotiation, conferencing, 
facilitated discussions, adjudication, case appraisal, ombudsman and neutral evaluation.152 
ADR has been cited as being less expensive and more time efficient than litigation specifically, 
the use of facilitative dispute resolution procedures such as mediation, the efficiency of tax 
administration and voluntary compliance can be improved.153  
The shift towards ADR in tax dispute resolution denotes KRA are oriented towards building 
trust, support and respect within the community which in turn encourages voluntary 
compliance. This is certainly evident in KRA’s mission statement154 and seems to be the 
driving force behind the adoption of the ADR framework.155 The OECD has suggested the use 
of cooperative compliance by tax administrators, especially when dealing with corporate tax 
disputes and vice versa.156 Under cooperative compliance, tax administrators should 
demonstrate commercial awareness, impartiality, proportionality, transparency and 
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responsiveness.157 The taxpayer, in turn, should exercise disclosure and demonstrate 
transparency.158 The cooperative compliance approach aims at resolving disputes quickly, and 
thus ADR is the best basis of tax dispute resolution.159 Kenya has taken measures to reform the 
tax dispute resolution system along these lines: TPA harmonised and simplified tax dispute 
resolution procedures, the TATA established a specialised independent tribunal, and the KRA 
has created an internal ADR framework and the CTDR. According to the Commissioner 
General of the Kenya Revenue Authority, the launch of the framework is informed by the need 
for transparency in dealing with taxpayers and enhancing compliance through building trust 
and fair treatment of the taxpayer.160  
While KRA’s ADR framework has been appreciated and applauded, the Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK) makes two general observations of the framework.161 
First, that the framework is too limited in scope as it only provides for facilitated discussions 
as the sole dispute mechanism and second, that the framework does not present a balanced 
approach by KRA to the dispute resolution process.162 The likely effect is that if the framework 
is implemented as is, it is likely to see limited uptake by taxpayers.163 Furthermore, Kashindi 
notes that the disclaimer in the ADR framework absolving KRA of responsibility, liability or 
duty of care for consequences suffered on relying upon the information contained in the 
framework or any decision based on it does not inspire confidence in the taxpayer and displays 
unwillingness by KRA.164  
Kashindi has also identified two critical shortcomings of the ADR framework. The first 
shortcoming is that the framework is inadequately supported within the law.165 The second is 
that the ADR framework as is without any express statutory backing may be in conflict with 
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the Article 210 of the Constitution of Kenya.166 Nevertheless, KRA has committed itself to use 
the Tax Appeals Tribunal and ADR.167 The main objective being reducing litigation, freeing 
up revenue and timely resolution of tax disputes.168 KRA also seek to reduce the cost of 
collection of revenue.169 The courts based on Article 159 (2), as mandated have also 
encouraged the use of ADR in tax disputes.170 
 DSD 
According to Ury, Brett and Goldberg, DSD  principles assist in developing dispute resolution 
procedures that promise lower costs, promote higher quality resolution, and develop the 
motivation to use the procedures and the skills necessary to use the procedures effectively.171 
Frank remarks that DSD has its foundation in the ADR movement and more specifically in 
organisational dispute resolution.172 Goldberg et al. provide a historical account of the ADR 
movement, and the goals and justifications of ADR championed by the ADR movement, 
amongst them are: reduced caseloads and expenses, speedy resolution, improve public 
satisfaction and increased public compliance.173 The ADR movement also opposed the 
assumption and mentality that within an adversarial system of law that it is the lawyer’s 
responsibility to ‘win’ for the client employing every means available and allowable - 
essentially that the object of dispute resolution is a victory.174 The result of such an approach 
is that courts issue narrow win-lose outcomes rather than problem-solving solutions that take 
into account the context of the dispute and the broader relationships of the parties.175 The search 
for win-lose outcomes was cited as one of the problems that hinder effective resolution of tax 
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disputes in Kenya.176 Under the current constitutional order which promotes the use of ADR177 
and mandates substantive justice over procedural technicalities178, this is no longer a tenable 
philosophy of dispute resolution philosophy. 
Franck observes that DSD has been employed successfully to avoid expensive and destructive 
litigation. Furthermore, DSD has improved dispute systems by reducing the time and money 
involved in resolving conflicts.179 Nabatchi and Bingham note that better dispute systems foster 
shared confidence and enhance prospects of cooperation.180 Such dispute systems reinforce 
norms of reciprocity which are essential for continued relationships.181 Norms of reciprocity 
are especially crucial in the context of tax dispute resolution with KRA since the latter seeks 
to enhance compliance through building trust and cooperation with the taxpayer. 
Wolski summarises that the central goal is to reduce the costs associated with dispute 
resolution, where costs are measured by reference to four broad criteria: transaction costs 
(money, time and emotional energy expended in disputing), satisfaction with procedures and 
outcomes, long-term effect of the procedures on the parties’ relationship and recurrence of 
disputes.182 High transaction costs, lack of economic efficiency of dispute resolution, low 
economic competitiveness and high caseloads in civil justice systems have been cited as factors 
that motivate the use of DSD to institute dispute resolution reforms.183 Another core concern 
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for DSD is justice and accountability.184 According to Amsler and Sherrod, DSD, through 
design provides a forum through which justice can be accessed and when used as a tool for 
evaluation, it can be used to determine a system’s commitment to and potential for justice.185  
Constantino and Merchant state that the process of DSD consists of four stages; a) 
organisational diagnosis, b) system design, c) implementation and d) exit, evaluation, and 
diffusion.186 Nabatchi and Bingham note that organisational diagnosis and systems design are 
the most critical.187 System design as one of the four processes of DSD involves following the 
six general principles proposed by Ury, Brett and Goldberg.188  
Nabatchi and Bingham claim that systems that follow these general design principles are more 
likely to produce more positive dispute outcomes.189 Smith and Martinez state that the 
principles bear on whether the criteria and expected outcomes of a successful dispute system 
can be met.190 This thesis will focus on the system design aspect of DSD. 
 DSD in Tax Dispute Resolution 
While DSD was initially developed in the context of ADR however, Bingham notes that its 
scope is wide enough to be used in "the creation of systems within administrative agencies for 
handling both their own internal conflict and for carrying out their public mission to create, 
implement, and enforce public policy."191 To this end, in the field of tax dispute resolution, 
several studies have utilised DSD to evaluate the designs of tax dispute resolution systems.  
Bentley utilises the six principles proposed by Ury, Brett and Goldberg to analyse the 
Australian Tax Office's (ATO) complaint-handling procedure.192 In the analysis, Bentley 
concluded that the complaints handling procedure met all six of the principles and the 
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Australian Tax Office was eager to resolve problems raised by the taxpayer, in line with their 
goal of increasing taxpayer compliance.193 Bentley’s study made several suggestions to make 
the procedure more effective based on the principles, including increasing flexibility on access 
to the procedure, increasing room for further interaction and allowing receipt of feedback from 
the taxpayer.194 In an updated study, Bentley uses his previous study as a foundation to develop 
a model charter of taxpayers’ rights to be used as best practice for tax administrators.195 In the 
updated study he applies all six principles and suggests the inclusion of two more principles as 
follows: provide effective mechanisms for measuring qualitative success; and provide 
mechanisms for monitoring, reviewing and improvement.196  
Mookhey also evaluates the Australian Tax Office's dispute resolution model against the Ury, 
Brett and Goldberg Model.197 Mookey finds that the Australian Tax Office's (ATO) dispute 
resolution model meets much of the best practice principles.198 However, she identifies room 
for reform such as improving affordable access at the first levels of dispute resolution to ensure 
early stage negotiation with a positive outcome.199 The study concludes that the fact that the 
ATO model meets much of the best practice principles reflects the assertions of the Australian 
Tax Office's eagerness to resolve disputes with taxpayers.200  
Jone, evaluates the design of tax disputes systems in New Zealand, Australia, The United 
Kingdom and The United States.201  In the study, Jones looks at how these systems achieve 
their objectives through DSD principles.202 The study concludes that the United Kingdom and 
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the United States meet most of the DSD principles.203 The two systems provide multiple points 
to access the system; however, their revenue authorities seem reluctant to promote or encourage 
ADR.204 Of the four jurisdictions, New Zealand appears to be worst placed with no loopbacks 
to previous dispute resolution procedures.205 Furthermore, the New Zealand system appeared 
to be lacking both in terms of the structure of the system and the support and championship of 
the system.206 Jones notes that in all four jurisdictions, the taxpayers display negative 
perceptions of fairness which can be attributed to the fundamental adversity existing between 
the taxpayer and the tax authority and also due to the power imbalance that exists between 
them.207 Bently provides the following justification for the application of DSD in tax dispute 
resolution, “For all tax systems, dispute system design within the tax administration is 
becoming critical to the successful engagement of taxpayers with the system.”208 On Bentley 
and Mookhey’s studies, Jones notes that the focus on Australia provides ‘‘scope for a 
comparative DSD analysis to be conducted on the tax dispute resolution procedures in other 
jurisdictions in order to compare the effectiveness of the design of different jurisdictions’ tax 
dispute resolution procedures’’.209 This thesis aims to contribute to this body of literature by 
contributing a similar analysis of Kenya’s tax dispute resolution system. 
 Chapter Breakdown 
Chapter one contains the structure and contents of the research proposal. It states out the 
research problem, the research questions, the hypothesis, literature review, theoretical 
framework, the scope of the study and the methodology.   
Chapter two gives a description of how general disputes emerge and how tax disputes in 
particular develop. This chapter will also give an overview of the interests of the parties in a 
tax dispute, which inevitably determines the positions they hold in a dispute and how the parties 
may approach tax disputes. Chapter three examines and discusses Kenya’s tax dispute 
resolution system and procedures. 
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Chapter four gives a critical background to DSD and explains the DSD principles utilised in 
this study. Chapter five critically evaluates Kenya’s tax dispute resolution system and 
procedures through the DSD principles discussed in chapter four.  Finally, chapter six 

























EMERGENCE OF TAX DISPUTES 
 Introduction 
Disputes are inevitable in society.210 They are not confined to any specific space, time or social 
traditions.211 Disputes are to be expected in relationships where parties have different 
‘interests’.212 To this extent, human beings have been described as ingenious social animals in 
their responses to resolving disputes and interpersonal conflicts.213 These responses to 
resolving disputes often involve merging positions based on divergent interests and turning 
them into a single outcome.214 This chapter explores how tax disputes emerge by utilising 
general theories on how disputes, and highlight the interests that the tax authorities and the 
taxpayer often seek to protect in disputes between them.  
For tax authorities, their interests can be conceptualised as task-interests, i.e., 
interests connected to the work that they perform.215 These task-interests play a role in dispute 
resolution procedures and will be examined in this chapter. While the interests of the taxpayer 
may be varyingly complex, entangled and hard to identify, it is generally accepted in dispute 
resolution research has identified that taxpayer interests just like the parties in a civil dispute 
can fall within three broad categories: vindication and protection of their individual rights, self-
interest maximization and fair treatment.216 This chapter analyses the initial aspect of DSD 
namely what types of disputes exist.217 By understanding the nature of the conflict and the 
interest of the parties, one is able to determine what channels would result in the most 
appropriate conflict resolution.218  
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 Emergence of Disputes  
Disputes can be defined as a divergence of interest.219 The ‘interests’ here can be broadly be 
conceptualized as the “predispositions embracing goals, values, desires, expectations, and 
other orientations and inclinations” that influence individual behaviour.220 Disputes are said to 
emerge in three stages: naming, claiming and blaming. 
 In the first stage, an experience that was previously not perceived as injurious is perceived as 
an injurious experience.221 Recognizing and labelling an experience as injurious is known as 
naming.222 Naming arises when the potential disputant believes that another party has either 
made a mistake, denied them an entitlement or has acted in bad faith. The second stage involves 
attributing the injury to the fault of another individual which is known as blaming.223 The third 
stage involves a request for some remedy for the perceived injury from the person who is 
believed to be at fault for causing the injury; this is known as claiming.224 A claim is then 
transformed into a dispute if the person who is believed to be at fault rejects the claim in whole 
or in part.225  
In summary, for a dispute to emerge, a grievance must be attributed to another party. The 
aggrieved party must then formulate goals or interests that the hold that directed at the other 
party, which they believe that the other party can address or satisfy.226 The aggrieved party 
may seek a remedy in the form of more money, or other matters in the other party’s control 
such as a change in behaviour.227 Considering disputes in this way helps us understand the 
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underlying cause of the dispute, the interests of the disputing parties, and how effective a 
mechanism will be in resolving the dispute.228 
 The Emergence of Tax Disputes 
Kenya employs a self-assessment system which was implemented in 1992.229 Under the self-
assessment system, individuals determine their tax liability directly, without any intervention 
from KRA and submit tax returns and payments.230 The self-assessment model is based on 
voluntary compliance, and tax administrators generally accept the tax return and payment in 
the first instance without technical scrutiny.231 This system acknowledges that the taxpayer is 
in the best position to determine their own tax liability as they have first-hand knowledge of 
their business affairs and financial transactions.232  
As part of the revenue authority’s role in ensuring compliance with tax laws, it is empowered 
to conduct tax audits.233 Tax audits are essentially examinations into the taxpayer’s return to 
determine whether the taxpayer has correctly assessed and reported their tax liability and 
fulfilled their legal obligations.234 The primary purpose of a tax audit is to determine whether 
the information provided by the taxpayer in their tax return is accurate or not.235 In determining 
the tax full tax liability of a taxpayer the commissioner may by written notice, require a 
taxpayer or registered person to produce for examination any documents.236 A tax audit will 
involve auditors from KRA checking whether the taxpayer, based on the documents provided,  
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has correctly applied the law.237 Under the TPA, the KRA is permitted to carry out audits for a 
period of 5 years from the year of assessment.238  
A dispute begins to develop between KRA and the taxpayer where KRA identifies a possible 
misapplication of the law or inconsistency in the tax return. Within the framework of how 
disputes emergence, identification corresponds to naming.239 In the case of an audit, the 
identified misapplication of the law is then brought to the attention of the taxpayer. The 
taxpayer under audit is then asked to respond or is requested to provide further information to 
the auditor that would explain the identified issues. The request for the taxpayer’s response, 
coupled with a proposed adjustment of the tax return to reflect what the auditor considers to be 
the taxpayer's full tax liability corresponds to claiming.240 Where the taxpayer agrees that there 
has been a misapplication of the law on their part and there exists some tax liability, the self-
assessment initially submitted is amended and the commissioner issues the taxpayer with a 
written notice setting out the amendment and amount of tax due.241 If the taxpayer and the tax 
authority do not agree on the auditor's findings, the commissioner will still amend the 
assessment and issue the taxpayer with a written notice setting out the amendment and amount 
of tax due. The issuing of an amended assessment does also correspond to the issuing of a 
claim. At this point, the taxpayer can reject the ‘claim’ of the commissioner in whole or in part 
by filing a notice of objection to the decision of the commissioner in writing within 30 days 
setting out the grounds of the objection.242 Possible grounds of objection include the assertion 
that the commissioner has misinterpreted a specific provision of the law or that there is another 
relevant provision of the law pursuant to which an audit of the taxpayer’s return would not 
result in the assessment decision.   
Where the taxpayer has not submitted a tax return, the commissioner may issue what is known 
as a default assessment. In default assessment, the tax liability is assessed by the commissioner 
based on the information available to the commissioner and to the best of the commissioner's 
judgment.243 Once a default assessment is issued the taxpayer can file a notice of objection 
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against the default assessment within 30 days. The commissioner is expected to decide on the 
notice of objection from the taxpayer within 60 days either allowing the objection or 
confirming the assessment.244  
 Characteristics of Tax Disputes 
Unlike most civil disputes which involve a ‘Perceived Injurious Experience' (PIE), tax disputes 
are usually about ‘Perceived Erroneous Applications of the Law' (PEAL).245 The claims raised 
by the tax authority are based on their interpretation of what the law provides, whether the law 
has been applied correctly by the taxpayer and whether the taxpayer has met their full 
obligations as set out in the law.246 To persuade and convince the tax authority in a dispute 
involving a PEAL, the taxpayer would have to successfully advance legal arguments that 
showing that the in naming and claiming, the tax authority erroneously applied the law either 
through wrong interpretation or the facts correspond to another provision.247 Disputes that 
begin with PEALs may at times become subsumed with disputes about a PIE.248 A PEAL 
dispute may be subsumed where other interests other than tax liability become immediately 
more prominent to the taxpayer, for example, their rights as enshrined under the bill of rights 
or procedural justice. The need to protect property rights has been cited as one of the reasons 
behind tax disputes.249  
 Interests of  the Parties in Tax Disputes 
 KRA’s Interests 
2.3.1.1. Maximizing Revenue Collected and Enforcing the Law 
Taxation can be said to have three main goals: to raise revenue to fund public goods and 
services, to mitigate the harsh effects of unequal distribution of wealth and to regulate private 
economic activity.250 In pursuit of these goals and to implement the laws that support these 
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goals, legislatures transfer the power of administration to specific public agencies. 
Administration is how the state accomplishes its ends.251 Therefore, it may be reasonably 
concluded that public administration serves political interests.252 Virtually all job tasks 
undertaken by administrators relate to parliamentary goals.253 Not only does public 
administration implement the legislation by parliament, but it also depends structurally on the 
executive branch of government.254 In Kenya, Parliament is in charge of public finance 
functions such as appropriating funds and levying taxes.255 Under Article 95 of the 
Constitution, the national assembly is tasked with appropriating funds for expenditure by the 
national government and other state organs. This Article effectively vests the power to levy 
taxes in the National Assembly.256 The national government can impose  income tax, value-
added tax, customs duties and excise tax.257 Tax administration, either through a collection 
agency embedded in the executive or a semi-autonomous authority, is essentially, a means in 
pursuit of these goals or ends. KRA was established in 1995 by  the Kenya Revenue Authority 
Act258. KRA is a semi-autonomous revenue authority distinguished from other revenue 
collection agencies by a higher degree of administrative and financial independence from the 
national government.259 According to the preamble and Section 5 (1) of its establishing Act, 
KRA’s main purpose is to assess and to collect government revenue. In doing so, KRA 
administers and enforces 18 Acts of parliament260, advises the government on all matters 
relating to tax administration261 and collection of revenue, and performs any other functions 
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concerning revenue. Furthermore, under the TPA, it is one of the functions of the commissioner 
to control, collect and account for taxes.262 KRA, therefore, operates based on delegated 
authority and power.263 This delegated authority and power is exercised over taxpayers whose 
main obligation is the payment of tax, as well as the fulfilment of formal duties most of which 
require collaboration with KRA.264 In the discharge of its core mandate, KRA collects and 
accounts for over 95 per cent of the government's ordinary revenue.265 
2.3.1.2.  Voluntary Compliance 
Free-riders pose a significant problem in the provision of public goods.266 The free-rider 
problem occurs when individuals do not contribute to goods, especially public goods from 
which they derive benefits.267 Paying taxes presents an example of the free-rider problem— 
citizens who evade taxes will nonetheless utilize the public goods that are financed by the taxes 
paid by other law-abiding citizens.268 Tax authorities are armed with legal measures to persuade 
free-riders to meet their legal obligations and contribute to the benefit of the community.269 
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These authorities are placed in social positions that allow them to foster and maintain 
environments that influence the behaviour of individuals.270  
Tax compliance involves the taxpayer filing all required returns on time, and the tax return 
accurately reports the taxpayer's tax liability in accordance with the tax law applicable at the 
time of filing.271 Voluntary compliance refers to instances where the tax authority relies or 
depends on the taxpayer to assess the correct amount of tax on their return, file those returns, 
and pay the tax due in a timely fashion without the tax authority’s intervention.272 Voluntary 
compliance is one of the principal goals of any tax authority because it lowers the overall 
operational costs273 and reflects that, overall, taxpayers have accepted that paying taxes is an 
obligation as well as a necessity if the state is meant to provide public goods.274  
Tax disputes can have a significant impact on the overall experience that taxpayers have in 
interacting with a tax authority.275 The approach employed by the tax authority in a tax dispute 
shapes the experience of the taxpayer either positively or negatively, which can, in turn, impact 
voluntary compliance by taxpayers.276 When disputing with a taxpayer, a tax authority is not 
just concerned with enforcing the law and raising revenue; it is also concerned with eliciting 
the cooperation of taxpayers and encouraging voluntary compliance in the future.277 In a tax 
dispute, tax authorities would want to elicit the cooperation of the taxpayer and encourage 
better voluntary compliance so that disputes based on the same facts do not keep arising 
between the taxpayer and the tax authority. In their interactions with taxpayers, especially at 
the point of enforcement, the tax authority must be careful not to create an antagonistic climate 
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where the use of coercive power prevails.278 Taxpayers already have an inherent fear of tax 
authorities using their power to exploit them, and thus they use judgements of how the authority 
treats them to guide their decisions within continued legal interaction.279 If the tax authority’s 
goal is cooperative compliance from the taxpayer, the tax authority would do well to foster a 
‘service climate’ which emphasizes facilitation, fairness, and building trust.280 Taxpayers who 
interact with the tax authority within a ‘service climate’ are more likely to reciprocate this 
attitude of cooperation by contributing their share and voluntarily complying with their tax 
obligations.281  
 Taxpayer Interests 
2.3.2.1. Pragmatic Self-Interest Maximization 
Self-interest is a powerful motivator.282 In classical economics, self-interest is concerned with 
maximizing profits and minimizing losses.283 Other things equal, the greater the possibility of 
either making material gains or losses, the stronger the motivational pressure.284 In dispute 
resolution, self-interest is also one of the goals of the parties to the dispute.285 In the context of 
tax disputes, a pragmatic taxpayer would seek to avoid paying more taxes than they have 
already paid, thus maximizing the resources available to them. As explained in Section 2.2.1 
above, agreeing with the commissioner's assessment would ultimately result in the transfer of 
resources that would otherwise be available to the taxpayer as profits. Tax disputes usually 
revolve around PEALs.  For the taxpayer, the surest way of ensuring that their profits are 
maximized and losses minimized is to demonstrate that their interpretation and application of 
                                                 
278 Kirchler E, Hoelzl E and Wahl I, ‘Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance’, 219. 
279 Tyler T R and Lind E A, ‘Procedural justice’, in Sanders J and Hamilton V L (ed), Handbook of justice research 
in law, Kluwer Academic Publishers, New York, 2001, 65-92, 77. 
280 Gangl K, Hofmann E and Kirchler E, ‘Tax authorities’ interaction with taxpayers’, 19. 
281 Gangl K, Hofmann E and Kirchler E, ‘Tax authorities’ interaction with taxpayers’, 19. 
282 Cropanzano R, Goldman B and Folger R, ‘Self-interest: defining and understanding a human motive’, 26 
Journal of organizational behaviour, 8 (2005), 985-991, 986. See also; David C B, Atkinson-Schnell J L and 
DiBacco E A, ‘Explaining society: an expanded toolbox for social scientists’, 4 Journal of family theory & review, 
1(2012), 48-66, 52.  
283 Cropanzano R, Goldman B and Folger R, ‘Self-interest: defining and understanding a human motive’, 36. 
284 Cropanzano R, Goldman B and Folger R, ‘Self-interest: defining and understanding a human motive’, 36. 
285 Smith W Kent and Stalans L J, ‘Negotiating strategies for tax disputes’, 345. 
 38 
the law is correct and that no further tax liability arises.286 If the taxpayer’s notice of objection 
does not persuade the tax authority, the taxpayer will need to resort to a third-party intervention 
process by way of an appeal to determine whose legal interpretation or application is correct. 
2.3.2.2. Vindication of Rights 
Most tax disputes begin with PEALs, with the tax authority and the taxpayer at odds on the 
application of the law. A PEAL may be subsumed into a PIE with the taxpayer doing the 
naming, blaming, and claiming.287 A good illustration of this is a situation where the taxpayer 
perceives an assessment or a tax authority's decision, which is a PEAL, as violating the Bill of 
Rights; in this case, the taxpayer would be seeking vindication of their rights. Rights can be 
described as prescriptive legal norms that serve specific normative goals; for example, rights 
protect intrinsic interests such as human dignity, fair administrative action, access to justice or 
property.288 Consider the following example: a taxpayer seeks advice from KRA as to whether 
a particular exemption under the VAT Act applies to them. KRA replies in the affirmative, 
assuring the taxpayer that the exemption applies and that they are not required to charge VAT. 
After a few years, KRA realises that the exemption does not apply and that the advice they had 
rendered was based on the wrong interpretation of the law; KRA then elects to raise an 
assessment and demand the VAT not charged from the taxpayer. While the dispute is initially 
a PEAL, the taxpayer may feel aggrieved, having relied on KRA's advice, and perceive the 
assessment as a breach of their freedom from arbitrary deprivation of property and their right 
to fair administrative action. In this case, the aggrieved taxpayer may file a constitutional 
petition to have their rights vindicated by the High Court. Vindication involves the affirmation 
or the reinforcement of the right and a recognition of the inherent value of the underlying 
interest.289 For example, the right to property would protect the taxpayer from being arbitrarily 
deprived of profits by the tax authority.  In resolving disputes that transform from a PEAL to 
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PIE, a third-party is required to recognize the right and defend against its encroachment or 
interference and provide some remedy.290  
2.3.2.3. Fair Treatment 
Beyond just maximizing their self-interest, particularly in their interaction with legal 
authorities, citizens are generally highly concerned with whether they are being treated fairly, 
and whether the legal authority has followed due procedure leading up to their interaction.291 
In democratic societies, there is an expectation by citizens that administrative powers are 
exercised fairly.292 As Lord Diplock put it:293 
“Where an Act of parliament confers upon an administrative body functions and powers which 
involve its making of decisions which affect to their detriment the rights of other persons or 
curtail their liberty to do as they please, there is a presumption that Parliament intended that 
the administrative body should act fairly towards those persons who will be affected by the 
decisions.” 
Concerns regarding unfair treatment and lack of a caring approach by the public service was 
one of the reasons that the right to fair administrative action was enshrined in the Bill of Rights 
of the Kenyan Constitution.294 The concern with fairness ultimately stems from the inherent 
fear and apprehension that citizens have that legal authorities, including tax administrators, will 
use their immense power to deny them entitlements and exploit them.295 People will use 
impressions of fairness, especially procedural fairness, as a way of determining whether they 
are being exploited by an authority and thus ultimately whether they will cooperate with the 
authority.296 Fairness is highly valued because, if an authority is considered to be acting and 
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treating the citizen fairly, an assumption can be made by the citizen that cooperation is the 
better option without worrying too much about exploitation.297 Thus, people who believe that 
they have been treated fairly in dispute resolution or decision-making procedures are more 
likely to comply with the outcomes of the dispute or the procedure.298 In determining whether 
they are being treated fairly, and thus not being exploited by the authority, taxpayers will want 
to have: (i) the opportunity to present their case to the authority before final decisions are made, 
(ii) consistency in the way they are treated compared to other taxpayers, (iii) a decision based 
on consideration of all the facts and accurate information, (iv) a means of ventilating their 
perception of unfair treatment, and (v) evidence of concern for their rights by the authority.299 
If the taxpayer experiences what they consider to be unfair treatment by the authority, the 
taxpayer is alerted to the existence of conflicting interests with the tax authority.300 The 
perceived unfair treatment energizes the taxpayer to combat the decision of the authority.301 
One possible remedy available for the taxpayer, and an avenue for ventilation of the claim of 
unfair treatment is judicial review, whereby courts exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the 
activities of the authority.302 
 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how disputes emerge within a three-stage framework of naming, 
claiming, and blaming. Tax disputes follow a similar framework in that the tax authority does 
the naming and claiming by raising an assessment, especially after an audit. The taxpayer 
rejects the claim through an objection which leads to a tax dispute. The basis of the naming, 
claiming, and subsequent rejection of the claim involves each party perceiving that the other 
party has erroneously applied the law. A dispute on a perceived erroneous application of the 
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law can at times be subsumed into a dispute involving a perceived injurious experience such 
as a breach of rights or unfair treatment.  
This chapter has also considered the respective interests of the parties in tax disputes. KRA 
interests during a dispute are task-oriented, i.e., to maximize revenue collected, enforce the 
law, and encourage future voluntary compliance. The taxpayer’s interests can fall into three 
broad categories: to maximize self-interest by avoiding the payment of additional taxes, the 
vindication of their rights, especially their right against arbitrary deprivation of property, and 
fair treatment by the authority.  
From the discussion above, it is possible to begin to envision the dispute resolution procedures 
that would be most effective in resolving the disputes between the parties and satisfy as many 
interests as possible. For example, since it is the task of the tax administration to collect tax 
according to the law and not forgo revenue, the tax administration would probably seek to 
undertake this task with rigidity and employ coercive powers. Strictness and rigidity in 
enforcement, coupled with the pursuit of task-interests through litigation, may, however, result 
in an antagonistic climate between the taxpayer and the tax authority which may, in turn, result 
in reduced compliance. Furthermore, with less control over the process, the taxpayer may begin 
to perceive the authority's treatment as unfair. In this case, early engagement between the 
parties, through an interest-based procedure such as mediation, would allow the parties to 
ventilate and explore their underlying concerns whereby as many interests between the 
taxpayer and the tax authority are satisfied. 
From this chapter it is also apparent that the interests of the parties in tax disputes are not too 
divergent; it is possible to secure significant trade-offs in resolving the disputes through 
interest-based approaches such as negotiation or mediation. For example, if the parties 
negotiate a settlement that results in KRA foregoing revenue, but the taxpayer was treated 
fairly, that taxpayer is likely to be voluntarily complaint in future and the same dispute is 







LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR TAX DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 Introduction 
A tax dispute occurs when a taxpayer, having a contrary view to the tax authority on the 
application of the law takes a course of action rejecting the tax administrator’s application of 
the law. Broadly, this chapter examines the legal framework and the procedures that enable the 
taxpayer to reject and ventilate their rejection of what the taxpayer perceives to be an erroneous 
application of the law. The framework set out in this chapter is used to resolve tax disputes 
which may be characterized as ‘PEALs’. ‘PEALs’ are resolved by focusing on the merits of 
the commissioner's decision with the taxpayer having to prove that the decision was 
erroneous.303 The procedures through which the taxpayer may prove that the tax administration 
erroneously applied the law include; objections, applications for review, facilitated discussions 
and appeals all of which are set out in the acts examined in this chapter.  
 Tax Procedures Act 
The TPA came into force on 19th January 2016. The objective and purpose of the act is to 
provide for uniform procedures in tax law thus promoting consistency and efficiency in 
administration in administration and facilitating tax compliance.304 Besides consolidation, the 
TPA also seeks to modernize tax administration in Kenya and align tax administration in Kenya 
to international best practices.305 In line with its main objective and purpose, the TPA 
consolidates dispute resolution procedures in the ITA and the Value Added Tax Act (VAT Act 
(repealed)). Before, the TPA, both the ITA and the VAT Act each provided for their procedures 
for objecting to commissioners' decisions and appeals to their respective tribunals.306 
Procedures for dispute resolution were consolidated into part VIII of the TPA. 
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 Objections, Appeals and Settlement 
Taxpayers have a right to raise an objection against tax decisions made by the commissioner.307 
In section 2 of the TPA, a tax decision means; assessments, determination of tax payable by 
the taxpayer, decisions on application by a self-assessment taxpayer, a refund decision and a 
demand for a penalty. Under section 51 (1) of the TPA, an objection is the first recourse 
available to the taxpayer against any decision of the commissioner and must be filed before 
any proceedings under any written law. The courts have held that the purpose of section 51 (1) 
is to allow the commissioner to first entertain the objection and to determine the same.308 The 
objection must be made within 30 days of being notified of the tax decision.309 The period of 
30 days can be extended if the objection is late due to absence from Kenya, sickness or other 
reasonable cause.310  
An objection from the taxpayer should unconditionally set out the clear and unambiguous 
position of the taxpayer.311 Grounds of an objection are precise if they unequivocally deal with 
all aspects of the assessment, provide clear answers for the assessment and specify the 
taxpayer's position on the figures provided by the commissioner in the assessment.312 There is 
no particular form for the objection, but it should be sufficiently framed to differentiate it from 
correspondence from the taxpayer seeking further particulars or indulgence.313 Provided the 
grounds of the objection are precise, and the taxpayer has paid the tax, not in dispute, the 
objection will be considered validly lodged.314 If an objection is not validly lodged, the 
commissioner is supposed to notify the taxpayer.315 Where a taxpayer has filed an objection 
which has been determined as invalid and filed out of time, some courts have entertained 
judicial review proceedings arguing that the judicial review proceedings are the only recourse 
for a taxpayer.316  In  Anne Wambui Njoroge v Kenya Revenue Authority & another, however, 
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the court held that the correct recourse for a taxpayer whose objection has been determined 
invalid is to seek an extension of time from the commissioner to file a fresh objection.317  
The objection by the taxpayer is reviewed by an internal dispute resolution committee 
consisting of the audit manager, the compliance manager, the policy unit technical manager 
and the station head of the relevant station.318  If the matter requires further consideration, it is 
escalated to the “Technical Forum” in the head office.319 This internal review is vital to ensure 
the ‘correct or preferable decision is made' and to minimize the number of applications for 
judicial review, especially on the ground that the decisions are unreasonable.320 The 
commissioner may after considering the objection, allow it, allow it in part or disallow the 
objection.321 The decision arising out of the objection is known as the objection decision.322 
The objection decision must be in writing, and it should include all necessary steps to give 
effect to the decisions.323 If the commissioner does not decide within 60 days, the objection by 
the taxpayer is allowed.324 
A taxpayer who is dissatisfied with an objection decision may appeal to the TAT by lodging a 
notice of intention to appeal in accordance with the provision of the TATA.325 Sections 53 and 
54 of the TPA provide for appeals to the High Court and subsequently to the Court of Appeal. 
For an appeal to the High Court, the appeal should be lodged within 30 days of the Tribunal's 
decision while an appeal to the Court of Appeal should be lodged within 30 days of the High 
Court's decision.326 Appeals to the Court are on matters of law only.327 Generally in appeals, 
either to the Court or to the Tribunal, the taxpayer ought to rely on the grounds of the objection 
unless the Court or the Tribunal allows the person to add new grounds.328 
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Subject to the permission of the court or the TAT the parties to the dispute can be granted 90 
days from the date of permission to settle the dispute out of court or out of the TAT.329 If the 
parties fail to settle the dispute the matter is referred back the tribunal or court that had 
permitted the matter to be settled out of court.330 This provision allowing for out of court 
settlement was a welcome addition to the TAT as it provided the parties with an opportunity to 
attempt to resolve the dispute out of court or out of the Tribunal.331 Section 55 of the Tax 
Procedures Act has been criticised for not being adequate in guiding the parties on how to go 
about the settlement.332 Beyond giving a timeline within which the settlement must take place, 
section 55 does not give any context to the settlement, neither does it provide for any 
framework or rules to guide the parties.333 Despite the lack of a legislative framework to guide 
the parties, it has been argued that the wide framing of section 55 allows parties to theoretically 
explore a wide range of ADR options to settle the dispute.334  
 The East African Community Customs Management Act, 2004  
The East African Community Customs Union (EACCU) is established by Article 2 (1) of the 
Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union (The Protocol). The protocol 
is founded under Article 2, Article 5 and Article 75 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the 
East African Community.335 The East African Community Customs Management Act, 2004 
(EACCMA) provides for the management and administration of customs within the East 
African Community.336 EACCMA provides for both the substantive and procedural law 
governing customs in the EACCU.337 Furthermore, EACCMA is heavily based on the Revised 
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Kyoto Convention which simplifies customs procedures.338 Part XX of EACCMA provides for 
appeals. 
 Applications for Review and Appeals 
Any person affected by a decision or omission of the customs commissioner has a right to 
appeal.339 In section 229 (1) of EACCMA, a person directly affected by the decision or 
omission of the commissioner on matters relating to customs is required to apply for a review 
of that decision within 30 days. A person is ‘directly affected' if the decision or omission of the 
commissioner is prejudicial to their interests or rights which includes both agents and 
principals.340 The application for review must be lodged in writing setting out the grounds upon 
which the application for review is lodged.341 Furthermore, for an application for review to be 
valid, it must be in terms that are unambiguous, clearly showing that the aggrieved person is 
requesting the commissioner to review their decision.342 The commissioner is empowered in 
section 229 (3) to accept an application lodged out of time if there is a reasonable cause and 
there is no unreasonable delay. The commissioner must communicate their decision of the 
application for review under section 229 (1) within 30 days stating the reasons for the 
decision.343 If the decision is not communicated within 30 days of lodging the application for 
review, the application will be deemed to have been allowed.344 The courts have held that where 
an aggrieved party has filed an application for review, the commissioner must make their 
decision within 30 days otherwise it is deemed that the application is allowed this is even 
though the commissioner and the aggrieved party were engaging in correspondence beyond the 
30 days given to the commissioner and the aggrieved party had seemingly consented to the 
delay in receiving the decision from  the commissioner.345 Within the 30 days that the 
commissioner has to make a decision, the commissioner may order that the goods be released 
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at the request of the applicant for review upon payment of duty or the provision of sufficient 
security for duty and penalties.346  
Section 231 of EACCMA establishes a tax appeals tribunal. If a person is dissatisfied with the 
commissioner’s decision on the application, they may appeal the decision to the tax appeals 
tribunal within 45 days of being served with the decision. EACCMA does not provide for out 
of court or tribunal settlement of disputes. 
 Tax Appeals Tribunal Act 
TATA came into force on 1st April 2015. The TATA establishes the Tax Appeals Tribunal 
(TAT) to hear appeals against any decision made by the taxpayer.347 Furthermore, the TATA 
provides the procedure for appeals against tax decisions and consolidates the provisions of the 
ITA and the Customs and Excise Act Cap 472 (repealed) on appeals.348  
 Tax Appeals Tribunal: Membership, Structure and Jurisdiction 
The TAT is established under section 3 of the TATA. The TAT consists of a chairperson and 
not less than 15 members but no more than 20 other members.349 Not more than 5 members of 
the tribunal shall be advocates of the High Court of Kenya.350 Both the Chairperson and the 
members are appointed by the cabinet secretary responsible for matters relating to finance.351 
The chairperson holds office for a term not exceeding 5 years and is not eligible for 
appointment.352 Members of the tribunal hold offices for a term not exceeding 3 years, but 
unlike the Chairperson, the members can be reappointed for a further term of 3 years.353 The 
Chairperson of the tribunal must be qualified to be appointed as a judge of the high court.354 
For members of the tribunal, the members must have a degree in law, business, finance, public 
finance, economics, insurance or related disciplines and must have at least 10 years' experience 
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in the disciplines mentioned above.355 One of the shortcomings of local committees and 
tribunals established under the ITA or the VAT Act (repealed) for example was lack of requisite 
tax knowledge amongst the members of the local committees and the tribunal, hence the strict 
qualification requirements for membership to the tribunal under the TATA.356 
The TAT replaces appellate bodies under the ITA, namely the local committees and the tribunal 
established under section 83 of the ITA.357 The local committees and the tribunal under the 
ITA consisted of non-specialists who were independent of the KRA.358 The tribunals under the 
ITA heard appeals on section 23 and section 24 of the ITA which are anti-avoidance 
provisions.359 The local committees heard all other appeals.360 The Customs and Excise Act 
Cap 472 also established its tribunal to hear appeals on disputes arising from the decisions of 
the Commissioner. The TAT has also replaced the tribunal that had been established under the 
Section 127E Customs and Excise Act Cap 472.361  
The TAT is empowered to hear appeals filed against any tax decision made by the 
commissioner under any tax law provided the commissioner has been given notice.362 The TAT 
can either: affirm the decision under review, vary the decision under review or set aside the 
decision under review and either substitute the decision with their own or remit the matter back 
to the commissioner.363 The decision making powers that the TAT has under section 29 to 
ensure that any potential errors or defects, for example, an erroneous application of the law 
which may have led to a wrong may be set right.364 Essentially, the primary purpose of the 
TAT is to review the merits of the decision of the commissioner to ensure that the ‘correct and 
preferable’ decision is made based on the correct law and the relevant facts.365 In recognizing 
that the power of the TAT is not limited to the quantum of taxes payable or disputes of fact, 
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the courts have held that the powers of the TAT are wide enough to determine the legality of 
the decision of a commissioner.366 The reasoning behind the deference to the TAT especially 
where a party seeking judicial review remedies claims the decision by the commissioner is 
illegal is that judicial review by its nature is not supposed to go into the merits of a decision.367 
As such the most appropriate remedy for an aggrieved person is to appeal the decision to the 
TAT not to seek judicial review since it is most likely that a decision that is illegal is a decision 
that is not ‘correct or preferable’.368 In summary, the TAT has very broad powers in relation to 
decisions of the commissioners under any tax law. Courts exercising judicial review authority, 
have held that where the taxpayer is aggrieved by the decision-making process rather than the 
merits, the TAT would not be the appropriate forum or remedy.369 In ensuring that the 
jurisdiction of the TAT is respected, the courts have discouraged taxpayers from forum 
shopping where taxpayers file both appeals and institute proceedings for judicial review.370 
 Procedure for Appeal 
A person dissatisfied with the decision of the commissioner which is appealable may appeal to 
the TAT in accordance with the TATA.371 The appeal is initiated by filing a written notice of 
appeal with the TAT within 30 days after receiving the decision of the commissioner.372 The 
notice of appeal signifies the appellant's intention to appeal the commissioner's decision and 
sets in motion the exercise of the TAT mandate. The appellant must submit to the TAT a 
memorandum of appeal, the statement of facts and the tax decision within 14 days from the 
date of filing the notice of appeal. The appellant may seek an extension of time to file the notice 
of appeal and for submitting the appeal documents.373 An application for extension of time may 
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be granted if the intended appellant was absent from Kenya, owing to sickness or any other 
reasonable cause that may have prevented the applicant from filing the notice of appeal or filing 
the appeal documents.374 In determining an application for extension of time, the tribunal has 
been guided by the same principles that guide appellate courts in exercising their discretion to 
extend time, namely: whether the appeal is arguable, whether the delay was inordinate and 
whether extending time will be prejudicial to the respondent.375  
Evidence before the tribunal can either be given orally or through affidavits, subject to the 
direction of the TAT.376 The TAT is under an obligation to ensure that each party has an 
opportunity to make submissions on the evidence of the other party. The TAT is to determine 
the appeal within 90 days from the date the appeal is filed.377 In Okiya Omtatah Okoiti & 
another v Bidco Africa & 4 others, the court stated that if there is inordinate delay by the TAT 
in determining an appeal, the appellant can initiate judicial review proceedings, this is because 
proceedings beyond the 90 days period of determining the appeal might be in excess of the 
tribunal's jurisdiction.378 In determining the appeal, the TAT may affirm the decision under 
review, vary the decision under review or set aside the decision under the review and either 
substitute the decision with one of their own or remit the matter back to the commissioner.379 
The TAT can also award costs of the appeal.380 
Under section 28 (1) of TATA, the parties may apply to the TAT to be allowed to settle the 
matter out of court. Section 28 further provides that the TAT shall allow the request subject to 
the conditions it may impose.381 In a legislative sentence, the use of ‘shall’ creates a mandatory 
duty or obligation while the use of the word ‘may’ creates a discretionary power.382 Section 28 
(1) uses the words ‘shall’ and ‘may’ in the sentence when referring to the TAT effectively 
imposing two different obligations on the TAT. In essence, section 28 (1) places the TAT under 
an obligation to allow the parties to settle the matter out of court. On the other hand, how the 
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parties are to settle the matter out of court is subject to the discretion of the TAT. Compared to 
section 55 (1) of the TPA which also provides for out of court settlement, section 28 (1) is 
potentially restrictive. Section 55 (1) of the TPA is drafted in broad terms only providing that 
the parties have 90 days to settle the matter out of court or the tribunal, a plain reading of the 
provision does not reveal that the court or the tribunal may impose any restrictions or conditions 
on the out of court settlement. With regards to section 28 (1), it should be noted there are 
currently no rules or procedures under the TATA or the TPA providing procedures for out of 
court settlement or guiding the discretion of the TAT in imposing conditions for out of court 
settlement. The lack of rules or procedures however would not be a bar to their exercise of 
discretion under section 28 (1)  of the TATA because rule 27 of the Tax Appeals Tribunal 
(Procedure) Rules, 2015 provides that where there is no applicable procedure, under the rules 
or under TATA, the TAT has the discretion to determine an appropriate procedure.  
 Appeals to Courts 
When the tribunal has made a decision, an aggrieved party has a right to appeal to the High 
Court and on the determination of the appeal by the High Court, to the Court of Appeal.383 The 
aggrieved party has 30 days from the date of the decision of the TAT to give notice of the 
intention to appeal to the High Court.384 For an appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Notice of 
Appeal must be filed within 30 days of the decision of the High Court.385 Failure to give notice 
within the stipulated period would necessitate an application for the extension of time.386 For 
an appeal to the High Court, the appellant must then file a memorandum of appeal within 30 
days of filing the notice of appeal.387 Section 56 (1) of the TPA provides that appeals to the 
High Court shall be matters of law only.388 Thus an appeal in either the High Court and the 
Court of Appeal only involve judicial examination of the TAT's decisions and not re-litigation, 
where the parties can introduce new issues.389 However, the fact that appeals are on matters of 
law only does not preclude the High Court from admitting additional evidence.390 The High 
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Court is allowed to admit additional evidence because issues of facts may give rise to questions 
of law.391 Furthermore, additional evidence may be needed to determine the controversy 
considering the technical nature of tax appeals.392  
Under section 55 (1) of the TPA, the courts may permit the parties to a tax dispute to settle out 
of court. Settlement out of court is to be made within 90 days from the date the court permits 
the settlement. The broad framing of the provision suggests that the parties are not restricted in 
the avenues they may employ to settle the dispute out of court.393 If the dispute is not settled 
within 90 days, the dispute is referred back to the court. Unlike section 28 (1) of TATA, section 
55 (1) of the TPA does not provide whether the court may impose conditions on the out of 
court settlement.  
 KRA’s ADR Framework 
The ADR framework (framework) was introduced in June 2015 by KRA as a means to improve 
the internal dispute resolution process.394 The framework provides for the use of ADR to 
supplement the judicial and quasi-judicial processes.395 The framework recognizes that the tax 
dispute resolution process is mired with technical procedures, untimely decisions and high 
costs associated with litigation.396 The framework thus seeks to provide for flexibility, time 
efficiency and lower costs.397 The framework promises expedited dispute resolution, decreased 
costs, enhanced relationships and improved tax compliance.398  
The objectives of the framework include; providing for a taxpayer approach to dispute 
resolution, providing internal structures that support tax dispute resolution and providing a 
complementary approach to dispute resolution beyond those provided for in the TPA.399 KRA 
controls the framework and the ADR processes provided.400 Furthermore, the framework state 
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that it is legally underpinned by Article 159 (2) (c) of the Constitution 2010, Section 55 of the 
TPA and Section 28 of TATA.401 Article 159 (2) (c) provides that the courts are to promote 
ADR mechanisms in the discharge of their judicial functions. Section 55 of the TPA and section 
28 of TATA enable courts and the tribunal respectively to allow the parties to tax dispute, upon 
application, to settle the tax dispute out of court. A plain reading of section 55 and section 28 
does not immediately reveal whether KRA can create, implement and control the framework 
or that the provisions mentioned above provide for any particular procedure to be followed in 
settling tax disputes out of court.   
 Facilitated Discussion 
The ADR process provided for under the framework is facilitated discussions.402 Facilitated 
discussions under the framework is a voluntary process in which a dispute resolution 
practitioner known as a facilitator assists the commissioner and the taxpayer in a dispute to 
identify issues causing controversy, develop options for resolution and to amicably resolve the 
issues in controversy.403 The facilitator does not advise or determine the outcome of the 
process; instead they guide the parties.404 The facilitator may, however, advise on the process 
of facilitation.405 Under the framework, arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 1995 is expressly 
excluded.406 
Under the framework, the facilitator or the facilitation panel may comprise of KRA officers 
not lower in rank than a manager or external members from the office of the Attorney General, 
the Director of Public prosecution or the commission of Administrative Justice 
(Ombudsman).407 For effective facilitation, it is essential that the facilitators remain 
independent, as such facilitators are under a duty to disclose any conflict of interest and should 
not have been involved in the audit, investigation or the disputed decision.408  
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The role of the facilitator with regard to the discussions between the commissioner and the 
taxpayer is to convene the ADR meetings, provide administrative guidance, attest to the signing 
of the ADR agreements and generally to assist the disputing parties to reach an agreement. In 
undertaking their mandate under the framework, the facilitator should endeavour to ensure fair, 
equitable, legal and expeditious resolution of the dispute between the parties.409 The facilitator 
is not to be bound by unnecessary formality and should conduct discussions without undue 
procedural technicalities.410 Furthermore, the facilitator should remain neutral at all times.411  
Before engaging in ADR discussions, an ADR evaluation team must determine whether a 
dispute is suitable for ADR.412 A dispute is appropriate for ADR if: 413  
i. Settlement would be in the interest of good management of the tax system, overall 
fairness and the best use of recourses.  
ii. The cost of litigation would be high considering the prospect of success before a court 
or tribunal, the amounts due and the cost of collection.  
iii. There are complex facts and issues or evidential difficulties.  
iv. Settlement will promote compliance by the taxpayer 
A dispute will be considered inappropriate for ADR if:414  
i. The dispute relates to tax evasion or fraud; 
ii. Settlement would be contrary to the constitution or revenue laws; 
iii. The pursuit of the matter through litigation would promote compliance; 
iv. It would be in the public interest to pursue the matter through the judicial system; 
v. The taxpayer has not complied with any tax act, and the non-compliance seems 
deliberate. 
Where the parties reach an agreement under the framework, the agreement must be reduced 
into writing reflecting the issues resolved, the amount of tax recovered or not recovered, the 
issues resolved, withdrawal of the matter before the courts or the tribunal, undertakings given 
                                                 
409 Paragraph 12.0, Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
410 Paragraph 14.0 (a), Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
411 Paragraph 14.0 (d), Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
412 Paragraph 20.0, Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
413 Paragraph 20.1, Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
414 Paragraph 20.2, Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
 55 
by each party and mode of payment.415 The ADR negotiations and settlement must have a legal 
basis within the tax laws.416 Where an assessment has been adjusted as a result of the 
agreement, the commissioner is mandated to amend the assessment to give effect to the 
agreement within 14 days of signing the agreement.417 The taxpayer may seek a waiver of the 
penalties.418 Where the dispute is not resolved, the commissioner must explain to the taxpayer 
their rights to further object or appeal since the framework is not prejudicial to either right.419 
Where the parties have failed to reach an agreement in ADR a second attempt is only allowed 
where the is fresh evidence or where the is reasonable cause as may be determined by the 
parties.420 
 When to Engage in ADR 
The commissioner and the taxpayer may engage in ADR in two instances under the framework:  
at the objection stage after the taxpayer files an objection; and at the appeal stage after the 
taxpayer institutes an appeal in the tribunal or either party appeals to the court.421 At the 
objection stage, the framework provides that the parties may engage in ADR within the 
timelines that the commissioner has to make an objection decision.422 The framework provides 
that the taxpayer has an opportunity to be heard before the commissioner confirms an 
assessment.423 In the TPA the commissioner must decide within 60 days with regard to an 
objection, while under EACCMA, the commissioner must decide under within 30 days.424 
Engagement in ADR at this stage has no statutory basis as engagement in the TPA and TATA 
is linked to the appeal procedure. It is essential for the commissioner to decide under section 
51 (8) of the TPA within 60 days if the intention is not to allow the objection. Even where the 
parties are engaged in discussion or correspondence, and it seems as though the taxpayer has 
                                                 
415 Paragraph 21.0, Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
416 Paragraph 4.1, Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
417 Paragraph 21.2, Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
418 Paragraph 21.2 (ii), Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
419 Paragraph 21.4, Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
420 Paragraph 23.0, Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
421 Paragraph 6.1 and 16.1, Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
422 Paragraph 6.2, Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
423 Paragraph 6.1, Kenya Revenue Authority Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework in Tax, 2015.   
424 Section 51 (11), Tax Procedure Act (Act No. 29 of 2015) and Section 229 (5), East African Community 
Customs Management Act, 2004. 
 56 
acquiesced to a delay in receiving the objection decision, the objection decision will be deemed 
allowed if the 60 days lapse.425 Furthermore, it is questionable whether the parties will be able 
to engage in meaningful ADR within the 30-day period the commissioner has to decide on an 
application for review under EACCMA.   
The second opportunity that the parties have to engage in ADR is during the appeal stage either 
at the TAT or the High Court or the Court of Appeal. The use of ADR in the appeal stage 
before the TAT has a statutory basis in section 55 (1) of the TPA and Section 28 (1) of the 
TATA. For the High Court and the Court of Appeal, the statutory basis is in section 55 (1) of 
the TPA. Section 28 (1) the TATA obliges the TAT to allow the parties an opportunity to settle 
out of the tribunal subject to the conditions it may impose. The question that may be raised is 
whether the framework can form the basis of the conditions the TAT may impose. 
 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the dispute resolution procedures in the legislative framework 
namely the TPA, TATA and EACCMA are adversarial in nature. The procedure available 
invites the taxpayer to prove that the decision by the tax administration was incorrect. The 
procedures include requesting the tax authority to reverse its own decision through objection 
or an application for review. If the tax administration does not determine that their decision 
was erroneous, the taxpayer has a right of appeal to the TAT where they ask for the tax 
administration's decision to be re-examined to determine whether the correct and preferable 
decision was made. Depending on the determination by the TAT, the aggrieved party being 
either the taxpayer or the tax authority may apply to the courts. 
The provisions granting recourse against a "PEALs" are collectively in the Tax Procedures Act, 
the EACCMA and TATA. The TPA consolidated dispute resolution provisions from individual 
acts thus creating uniformity between the acts. TATA established a single tribunal with the 
power to review on merit the decisions of the commissioner. With the advent of TATA and the 
TPA, out of court and tribunal settlement was introduced. However, although the provisions 
are a welcome addition into the framework, the provisions hardly give any guidance or context 
as to how tax disputes are to be settled out of court. In 2015, KRA introduced a non-binding 
ADR framework to complement the statutory dispute resolution mechanism. Although not 
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expressly provided for in the statutory framework, the framework provides rules of conduct, 
























URY, BRETT AND GOLDBERG’S DSD PRINCIPLES 
 Introduction 
Disputes are inevitable.426 They are part of all relationships between all individuals who 
interact frequently.427 Fundamentally, they arise when parties express divergence because of 
perceived incompatibility of interests, needs and goals.428 The cost of disputing is often high 
in terms of transaction costs incurred, time and emotional energy invested.429 Furthermore, the 
outcomes of the dispute may be unsatisfactory meaning the parties do not get what they 
desire.430 The pattern of high dispute cost and unsatisfactory outcomes results in reduced 
profitability and efficiency and strained relationships.431 The inevitability of disputes means 
that not all dispute may be prevented.432 The negative consequences of disputes can be 
minimized if the parties ventilate their divergent interests, make trade-offs and arrive at 
mutually beneficial settlements.433 Thus disputes can be constructive consequences if the 
system the parties are using allows the parties to draw their deep-seated interests to the surface 
and channel them towards resolution.434 DSD creates dispute resolution systems that harness 
the constructive elements of dispute resolution and minimizes the negative consequences.435 
Ury, Brett and Goldberg propose six principles to be followed when designing a dispute system 
that promises to cut costs and to achieve gains from satisfactory outcomes. This chapter first 
gives a brief background to give context to the DSD model by Ury, Brett and Goldberg. 
Thereafter, this chapter sets out and analyses the principles proposed by Ury, Brett and 
Goldberg, therefore, setting the stage for their use as a means of evaluating Kenya's tax dispute 
resolution system in the next chapter. 
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 Historical Background to the DSD Principles 
DSD can trace its roots to the ADR movement in the United States during the 1970s and 
1980s.436 The ADR movement essentially sought to enhance access to dispute resolution to 
disadvantaged communities by providing alternatives to the public adjudication process.437 The 
need for alternatives to the public dispute system was informed by three significant concerns; 
overloaded courts which caused delays and expenses, the need for a specialized forum to 
resolve commercial disputes and the need to ensure the actualization of the ‘justice for all 
ideal'.438 The ADR movement thus advocated for the allocation of adjudication from the 
judicial forum to other alternative methods such as negotiation, mediation and arbitration.439  
The theories and practices underpinning DSD are drawn from conflict theory, organizational 
behaviour and ADR.440 DSD emerged in the 1980s as practical methods of improving conflict 
resolution in organizations.441 Initially, DSD was employed to systems that sought to manage 
fully developed disputes.442 DSD, was popularized by Ury, Brett and Goldberg in their 1988 
book, Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict where they 
set out a basic conceptual framework for dispute resolution and a practical approach to 
designing dispute systems.443 In the book Ury, Brett and Goldberg make three theoretical 
propositions. First that there are three approaches to resolving disputes namely: reconciling the 
disputants' underlying interests (interest based approaches), determining who is right (rights-
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based approaches) and determining who more powerful (power-based approaches) is.444 
Second, Ury, Brett and Goldberg argued that interest-based approaches such as negotiation and 
mediation were less costly in terms of transaction costs and more rewarding in terms of 
outcomes.445 Third, the goal of DSD is to design a system that is interest based and provides 
for low-cost rights-based procedures as back-ups.446 In proving their propositions,  Ury, Brett 
and Goldberg detail how the introduction of problem-solving negotiation into the dispute 
resolution system of a mine laden with wild cat strikes led to higher levels of satisfaction with 
outcomes and improved working relationships eventually leading to eleven months without a 
strike or mine closure.447 Furthermore, the introduction of grievance mediation before 
grievance arbitration in coal industry union disputes led to higher satisfaction with outcomes 
and substantial time and cost savings.448 Ury, Brett and Goldberg conclude by prescribing that 
parties should be encouraged to resolve their disputes by reconciling interests since it is less 
costly and more rewarding that rights and power based approaches.449 Based on the findings 
mentioned above and the conclusion, it emerged that organizations could deliberately and 
strategically select dispute resolution approaches and process thus ensuring more effective 
dispute resolution.450 Furthermore, instead of focusing on individual dispute resolution 
procedures in isolation, disputes would be more effectively managed through an integrated 
dispute resolution system comprising of negotiation, mediation and arbitration.451  
From the background above, it is apparent that DSD was conceived to be employed in an 
organizational context.452 DSD has grown beyond its organizational context and has employed 
to make proposals to address labour disputes, investment treaty disputes, consumer disputes, 
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tax disputes and to manage political conflict.453 The expanded scope of its application has led 
to DSD to be described as a new field of theory and practice to address dispute resolution.454  
 Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s’ DSD Principles 
DSD as a process of creating an effective, efficient and fair dispute resolution process 
promises: lower transaction costs, less lost time, fewer missed commercial opportunities, fewer 
power struggles and higher party satisfaction.455 DSD has also been said to enhance foster trust 
and enhance prospects of cooperation between parties within a continuous relationship.456 As 
such the central goal of DSD can be said to be to reduce the costs associated with dispute 
resolution, where costs are measured by reference to four broad criteria: transaction costs 
(money, time and emotional energy expended in disputing), satisfaction with procedures and 
outcomes, long-term effect of the procedures on the parties’ relationship and recurrence of 
disputes.457 A dispute system that achieves cost savings, higher satisfaction, enhanced 
relationships and low recurrence of disputes would be considered an effective and efficient 
dispute resolution system. For Ury, Brett and Goldberg, a dispute resolution system is effective, 
efficient and fair if it is interest oriented meaning most disputes are resolved through 
reconciling interests, some through determining who is right and the least through who is more 
powerful.458 Ury, Brett and Goldberg have developed six principles that are widely accepted 
for designing an effective and efficient dispute resolution system.459 The six principles are:  
a) Create ways for reconciling the interests of those in dispute; 
b) Build in “loop-backs” that encourage disputants to return to negotiation; 
c) Provide low-cost rights and power “back-ups”; 
d) Prevent unnecessary conflict through notification, consultation and feedback; 
e) Arrange procedures in a low to high-cost sequence; and  
f) Provide the necessary motivation, skills and resources to allow the system to work. 
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Adherence to these principles bear on whether the dispute resolution system is efficient, 
effective, assures high satisfaction with the outcome and preserves the relationships between 
the parties.460 Furthermore, dispute systems that follow these general principles are more likely 
to produce more positive dispute outcomes.461 The quality of a system may thus be judged by 
how well it conforms with these principles.462  
 Principle 1 - Create ways for reconciling the interests of those in dispute 
Interests are “needs, desires, concerns, fears” that a disputant has. Interests form the underlying 
positions that people take in a dispute.463 Reconciling interests involves the disputing parties 
exploring their concerns, making trade-offs and compromises where the interests are 
divergent.464 The most common procedure for reconciling interests is negotiation whereby the 
parties engage in discussions with a view of reaching an agreement that is mutually 
acceptable.465 The dispute system must establish clear negotiation procedures that are easy to 
follow and bring about negotiation as early as possible.466 The need for clarity in the procedure 
for the negotiation process cannot be overemphasized.467 The lack of a procedural framework 
for negotiation can discourage parties from using the negotiation procedure.468 Where there are 
procedural rules, it must be clear to the parties the applicable timelines to initiate and undertake 
the negotiations, the mechanisms for information exchange, the extent to which the parties are 
under a duty to maintain confidentiality and what happens if the negotiations are 
unsuccessful.469 The availability of well set out procedures provides procedural certainty and 
a degree of uniformity in application.470 Lack of clear procedures is a recipe for further 
disagreement between the parties.471 To motivate the use of interest-based there should be 
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multiple access points into the dispute system and procedures.472 Furthermore, the system 
should provide a negotiator with authority to negotiate and settle disputes.473 The dispute 
system should ensure that there are people available to assist and manage with respect to the 
negotiation procedures; this includes mediators who can help parties identify their interests and 
assist the parties to craft creative solutions.474  
 Principle 2 - Build in “Loop-Backs” to Negotiation 
Interest-based procedures such as negotiation or mediation are not always successful. If the 
interest-based procedures are not successful, the parties may have to result to rights and power 
contests which are costlier475. The system should contain procedures or mechanisms that allow 
and encourage the parties to return to negotiation where the parties are engaged in a rights 
contest.476 An example of a loopback procedure is advisory arbitration where the parties are 
provided with information about their rights and thus an independent standard that can help 
settle the case.   
 Principle 3 - Provide Low-Cost Rights And Power "Backups" 
DSD as conceived by Ury, Brett and Goldberg adopts a broader perspective in developing 
dispute resolution procedures.477 Instead of developing individual dispute resolution 
procedures, the Ury, Brett and Goldberg model seeks to form an integrated system.478 This is 
because it is recognized that despite the numerous advantages of interest based procedures, it 
may not be possible or desirable to resolve all disputes through reconciling interests.479 Interest-
based procedures would not be advisable where adjudication is the only way to resolve a 
question between the parties authoritatively.480 Primarily, the system should "consist of a series 
                                                 
472 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 46. 
473 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 61. 
474 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 48. 
475 Goh M G, Dispute settlement international space law: a multi-door courthouse for outer space, Martinus 
Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, 325. 
476 Goh M G, Dispute settlement international space law, 325. 
477 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, ‘dispute systems design’, 357. 
478 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, ‘dispute systems design’, 357. See also: Bingham L B and Nabatchi T, 
‘Dispute system design in organizations’, 108. 
479 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 15. 
480 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 15.  
 64 
of safety nets".481 Where one procedure fails another is available for use, this ensures that there 
are no procedural gaps in the system.482 Furthermore, the back-ups provide a known endpoint 
to the system.483 The rights and power procedures available should be flexible, simpler, quicker 
and relatively inexpensive.484 Low cost rights procedures are often characterized by informality 
and flexibility in procedure.485 An example of a low cost rights procedure is arbitration.  
 Principle 4 - Prevent unnecessary conflict through notification, consultation 
and feedback 
To prevent unnecessary conflict, a party intending to undertake an action that is likely to affect 
the other party the party taking the action should notify and consult the other party.486 
Notification ensures that the other party feels included in the process.487 Unilateral decisions 
are more likely to be perceived as unfair which could trigger aggression and reduce cooperation 
between the parties.488 Furthermore, notification provided the parties with an opportunity to 
identify points of indifference early so that an interest-based procedure can be employed.489 
The system should also include some form of post-dispute analysis and feedback. This post-
dispute analysis is essential to help the parties identify issues that may be symptomatic of a 
broader issue that needs to be dealt with.490 It is advised that at the post-dispute stage, there 
should be procedures to record and analyse dispute data.491 The post-dispute analysis is also 
important for purposes of ensuring accountability.  
 Principle 5 – Arrange Procedures in a Low to High-Cost Sequence 
One of the main propositions underpinning DSD is that in general, reconciling interests is less 
costly (in terms of money, time and emotional energy expended in disputing) than determining 
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who is right which is in turn less costly than determining who is more powerful.492 Considering 
this proposition, in order to save on costs of disputing, the procedures should be arranged 
gradually in steps from a low cost to a high-cost sequence.493 The suggested sequence of 
procedures is a prevention procedure involving notification and consultation mechanisms, 
interest-based procedures, for example, negotiation followed by mediation if the parties are 
unable to resolve the disputes themselves, a low-cost right procedure such as arbitration and 
then power back-ups.494 
 Principle 6 – Provide the necessary motivation, skills and recourses to use 
them  
To make sure the procedures work the parties must be motivated to use them; otherwise the 
procedures will fail.495 The parties must be encouraged, assisted and taught how to use interest-
based procedures which are the focal point of the system.496 A pragmatic appeal should be 
made to the parties to forego power procedures in the first instance so that the parties may 
accrue reduced transaction costs increased party satisfaction with outcomes, improved 
relationships among the stakeholders and lowered recurrence of disputes, all of which are 
associated with interest-based procedures.497 Where there is an imbalance in power dynamics, 
the procedures set out should ensure the parties have an opportunity for "voice" and control 
over the procedures.498 The system should have the following resources to ensure that they 
work effectively: people, institutions, norms, precedents and laws.499 
 Conclusion 
DSD involves intentional and systematic efforts to develop and arrange dispute resolution 
procedures in a way that promises lower costs and minimizes the negative aspects of dispute 
resolution. The central goal of DSD is to design interest-oriented dispute systems whereby 
most disputes are resolved through interest-based procedures such as negotiation and 
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mediation, some disputes are resolved through determining who is right through arbitration 
and the courts and the fewest disputes should be resolved through power contests. Interest 
oriented dispute systems promise reduced time and money involved in resolving disputes while 
guaranteeing satisfactory outcomes. Ury, Brett and Goldberg developed six principles that 
provide a practical approach in designing effective and efficient dispute resolution system. 
Dispute resolution systems that adhere to these six principles are considered effective and 
efficient in resolving disputes, and as such, they are efficiently designed. The first principle is 
the most key as it emphasizes that the system should put a focus on interest by providing for 
ways in which the parties may reconcile their interests. The second principles that the system 
should provide rights and power procedures that loop back to negotiation. The third is that the 
system should provide for low-cost rights and power backup. The fourth principle is that there 
is built in an obligation to notify and consult the other party when undertaking any steps that 
are likely to affects them to avoid further disputes. This is coupled with the need to build into 
the system post despite analysis and feedback. The fifth principle is that the dispute resolution 
procedures should be arranged in a low to high-cost sequence. The sixth principle is that 
motivation, skills and resources are to be given to ensure all the procedures work. In 
conclusion, the application of these principles in designing dispute resolution systems promises 













DISPUTE SYSTEMS DESIGN EVALUATION OF KENYA’S TAX 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM  
 Introduction 
The evaluation conducted in this chapter is motivated by KRA’s concern about the large 
volume of tax disputes being litigated in Kenya, and the desire to have the majority of tax 
disputes settled through ADR outside the judicial and quasi-judicial dispute resolution 
processes. The resolution of tax disputes through litigation is often considered unfavourable 
due to the delays and high costs involved.500 ADR in the context of tax dispute resolution 
promises: expedited dispute resolution, decreased cost of tax disputes, enhanced relationships 
between the taxpayer and KRA, and improved service delivery and voluntary compliance.501 
Spurred by the concern over large volumes of tax litigation, and the global trend towards ADR, 
KRA introduced the ADR Framework in 2015 hoping to improve the number of tax disputes 
settled by ADR, considering that in best practice up to 80 % of tax disputes are resolved by 
some form of ADR.502 About four years after the introduction of the ADR Framework and 
statutory provisions providing for out of court settlement, a majority of disputes are still not 
resolved through ADR.503 The objective of this chapter is to evaluate Kenya’s tax dispute 
resolution system against the DSD principles proposed by Ury, Brett and Goldberg to 
determine whether Kenya’s tax dispute resolution system is oriented towards the use of 
interest-based procedures and ADR to resolve a majority of tax disputes.  
 Evaluation against DSD Principles 
 The System Creates Ways for Reconciling The Interest Of Those In Dispute 
This DSD principle is the most important and crucial principle.504 A tax dispute resolution 
system that prioritises this principle must focus primarily on interests. For a dispute resolution 
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system to be said to focus on rights, it must create ways for reconciling the interest of the 
parties. The system must establish a negotiation procedure, multiple access points to the 
interest-based approaches, strengthen motivation to use the interest-based approaches through 
transparent procedures and structures, and provide for the availability of a third-party to assist 
where the parties are unable to resolve the dispute themselves. 
While Section 28 of TATA and Section 55 of the TPA enable parties to an appeal to settle the 
matter out of the tribunal and court respectively, these provisions give virtually no guidance, 
or context, on how the parties are to be engaged with a view of settling the matter out of 
court.505 The dispute resolution system established under the TPA, TATA, and EACCMA does 
not create ways for reconciling the interests of the parties as contemplated by Ury, Brett, and 
Goldberg for four main reasons.  
First, TPA, TATA, EACCMA do not establish clear negotiations procedures. This lacuna is 
especially true for EACCMA which does not provide for any form of ADR. Second, putting 
aside the lack of negotiation procedure, the engagement of ADR is not the first possible option 
under the TPA, TATA and EACCMA. Under the Acts, it seems to be part of the appeals 
procedure which are rights-based approaches to tax dispute resolution. Third, it is not enough 
to provide for out of court settlement; disputants need to be motivated to use the ADR 
procedure provided. A structured framework for interest-based approaches which emphasizes 
and encourages early use of interest-based approaches is the best way to motivate disputants to 
use it. TPA and EACCMA, the main procedural tax acts, lack such a framework. Fourth, the 
statutory framework lacks multiple entry points to the opportunity to use ADR. Under the TPA 
and TATA, the only express way by which the taxpayer and the tax authority may pursue ADR 
is when permitted to settle a matter out of court or out of the tribunal by the judicial body.  
Ultimately, the lack of statutory accommodation for ways and procedures through which 
parties may reconcile their interests early on when the dispute arises has been interpreted as a 
statutory and policy reluctance to use ADR in tax.506 Clearly, the statutory regime of tax dispute 
resolution does not focus on the interest of the parties.  Furthermore, the lack of statutory 
procedure or guidance is a recipe for further disputes, rather than resolution. For example, in 
Kenya Revenue Authority v Jimmy Mutuku Kiamba507 the taxpayer and the tax authority were 
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directed by the court to engage in ADR to determine the issues in controversy.508 KRA was 
reluctant to engage the taxpayer as directed by the court and, as a result, the taxpayer filed 
review proceedings requesting the court to review its orders. KRA responded that their 
reluctance was premised on the view that ADR was not appropriate in this case since it involved 
tax evasion which was precluded from the ADR Framework. The court held that although a 
tax dispute could be referred to ADR during an appeal, referral to arbitration was inappropriate 
in the circumstances of the case. The court ultimately reversed its order directing ADR.  
The ADR Framework does attempt to reconcile the interests of the parties through facilitated 
discussions. Although the Framework does not establish any negotiation procedure, it does 
provide clear procedures for facilitated discussions, setting out timelines, mechanisms for 
information exchange and what happens when facilitated discussions are unsuccessful. The 
main way in which the Framework fails in its attempt to reconcile the interests of the parties is 
that it does not enhance motivation for its use. The Framework lacks a clear and express 
statutory foundation which raises questions over procedural certainty and uniformity of 
application. Although it is apparently based on section 55 of the TPA and section 28 of TATA, 
this link is not clear to the provisions is not clear. The aforementioned provisions only provide 
for opportunities to engage in out of court settlement, it is not apparent how these provisions 
prescribe the use of the ADR Framework and furthermore, allow KRA to promulgate and apply 
the ADR Framework.  Furthermore, there is a disclaimer in the Framework providing that KRA 
does not take responsibility for consequences suffered by anyone acting or refraining from 
acting in reliance on the information contained in the framework. This disclaimer hardly 
enhances or encourages taxpayers to use the framework.509  
In general, despite the existence of the ADR framework and section 55 of the TPA and section 
28 of the TATA which provide for out of court settlement, it is doubtful whether the tax dispute 
resolution system, as a whole, creates ways through which disputants can reconcile their 
interests. Admittedly, section 55 of the TPA and section 28 of TATA provide that the 
commissioner may settle disputes out of court upon appeal; however what is fundamentally 
lacking is the legal basis for such a settlement and this has implications for whether the parties’ 
interests can actually be reconciled, even under the ADR framework.  
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In Chapter 2, it was pointed out that under the Constitution, Parliament impose taxes while 
KRA is mandated to collect the taxes. Further, Article 210 of the Constitution provides that no 
tax ought to be waived or varied except as provided by legislation. The Oxford Dictionary 
defines ‘waive’ as to ‘refrain from demanding compliance with a rule’.510 Thus, any time KRA 
refrains from collecting or enforcing tax law, that action must be provided for under the law. 
As such, any negotiated settlement reached under the ADR Framework or pursuant Section 55 
of the TPA and Section 28 of TATA, and which results in foregone taxes, must be strictly 
within the confines of the law. The type of settlement thus allowed under the current system is 
known as a principled settlement.511  
In contrast, there exists another type of settlement known as compromise settlement which is 
reached based on a cost-benefit analysis taking into account the uncertainty of litigation and 
the cost involved.512 Since there is no provision in the TPA allowing the commissioner to take 
into account factors such as the future voluntary compliance of the taxpayer in settling tax 
disputes, any settlements must be based on the same basis as the basis upon which assessments 
are made; this approach does not best advance or reconcile the interests of KRA and the 
taxpayer.513 The only legal settlement would be on an all or nothing basis and would require 
one of the parties to concede that the other party’s interpretation of the law is correct.514  
The use of principled settlements is reflected in the ADR Framework.515 However, in setting 
out the criteria to be applied in determining whether a dispute is appropriate for ADR, the 
Framework advocates for a cost-benefit analysis and consideration of the litigation risk, factors 
which should not come into consideration and a principled settlement.516 In other jurisdictions, 
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the power to reach a settlement on compromise basis is either expressly provided in statute517 
or has been inferred by the court as part of the power to manage and control taxes.518 
Considering the import of Article 210 of the Constitution, the power to settle on compromise 
basis cannot be inferred; rather, it would have to be expressly conferred by statute.519  
 Principle 2 - Build In “Loop-Backs” To Negotiation 
The loop-back procedure contemplated by Ury, Brett and Goldberg is a procedure that allows 
the parties to revert to negotiation after they are engaged in a rights contest. These loopbacks 
are important as they form a source of information or standards to guide the second attempt at 
interest-based procedures.520 The TPA and TATA contemplate that the first attempt to settle 
the matter is at the appeal stage and with the permission of either the court or the TAT.521 There 
cannot be said to be  a loopback under the statutory framework, because the statutory does not 
provide for any interest based procedure before an appeal has been filed in the TAT or the 
court.  
Under the ADR Framework, once the first attempt at facilitated mediation is unsuccessful, a 
second attempt is limited to instances where there is reasonable cause for a second attempt or 
fresh evidence.522 Thus, theoretically, it would be possible to engage in ADR at the objection 
stage, and if there is no agreement and the taxpayer appeals, the TAT allows the parties to settle 
the matter out of court. Although there is no loop-back procedure as contemplated by Ury, 
Brett and Goldberg, the Framework provides for a limited opportunity to loop -back to 
facilitated mediation even if the parties are engaged in a rights contest before a court or tribunal.  
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 Principle 3 – Provides for Low-Cost Rights and Power “Back-Ups” 
Interest-oriented dispute resolution systems resolve the majority of their tax disputes through 
interest-based procedures. However, it is recognized that not every dispute can be resolved 
through interest-based procedures that is why the model advocates for low-cost rights 
procedures and power back-ups. This principle is invariably tied to the first principle in that 
there should be ways in which the parties reconcile interest in the first instance, should these 
interest based procedures fail, low rights back-ups should be available. Kenya’s tax system is 
mainly adversarial; thus, rights procedures such as adjudication by a tribunal are provided for 
first, then alternatives to rights procedures are made available. Under Section 55 of the TPA 
and section 28  of the TATA, the settlement provided for requires the parties to have already 
been engaged in a rights contest in the form of an appeal either from the decision of the 
commissioner or from the TAT. Clearly, the use of interest-based procedures is a back-up for 
the rights procedure. The ADR Framework from KRA states that further complements the 
adversarial dispute resolution system. The approach of treating interest-based procedures as 
secondary to rights procedures such as litigation has been criticized since, under the new 
constitutional regime, ADR is elevated and applies to all disputes.523  
Under the ADR framework it is recognized that not all tax disputes can be resolved through 
ADR, for example tax evasion, and these are in the exclusive domain of rights-based 
procedures.524 As such there is a low cost “back-up” in the form of the TAT where the disputes 
that cannot be resolved in ADR cannot be resolved. Statutory tribunals are supposed to offer a 
lower cost experience for the user through lower filing fees, time expended and more flexible 
hearings.525 The TAT does exhibit these characteristics. On the lower filing fees, the TATA 
provides for a fixed fee regardless of the matter the amount of taxes in dispute. Under section 
12 of TATA, a person appealing has to pay a fixed fee of twenty thousand shillings. It should 
be noted that no portion of taxes is payable for a valid appeal to be lodged. In terms of time, 
the tribunal is mandated to decide within 90 days. Since the tribunal is only resolves a narrow 
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spectrum of legal i.e. tax disputes, it is expected that they are more efficient and such disputes 
would take reasonably less time in resolving than state courts.526  
Informality in procedure has often been associated with efficiency and lower cost in dispute 
resolution.527 Informality in procedure is what has led arbitration to be considered less costly 
than courts and the ultimate low cost procedure to determine right.528 Similar to arbitration one 
of the reasons that administrative tribunals are preferred over conventional courts is procedural 
flexibility.529 In terms of flexibility, the TAT is empowered to focus and limit the scope of 
hearings and they may even dispense with ‘in person hearings’.530 Also, although the 
proceedings are of a judicial nature, the taxpayer may appear in person or may be represented 
by their tax agent or an advocate.531 Unlike courts the TAT does not prohibit non advocates 
from appearing before it. Furthermore, evidence may be presented in multiple ways.532 
Flexibility is also determined by the ability of the adjudicator to modify its procedures when it 
is considered appropriate.533 Rule 27 of the of the Tax Appeals Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 
empowered the TAT to determine their own procedure where there is no applicable procedure.  
 Principle 4 - Prevent Unnecessary Conflict Through Notification, 
Consultation, And Feedback 
It is necessary for a party undertaking an activity that is likely to affect the other party to notify 
and consult the other party in advance to prevent unnecessary conflict. Under Article 47, of the 
Constitution, every person has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, 
lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair. Notification is a crucial component of procedural 
fairness, natural justice, and due process. When it comes to notices related to tax collection, 
the notice must state that it is a notice for tax collection, it must state the amount, the legal 
provisions supporting the notice, the sanctions, and inform the taxpayer of their opportunity to 
be heard.534 Failure to adhere to this would put the notice at risk of being quashed by the 
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court.535 Considering the right under Article 47 of the Constitution, KRA is always under an 
obligation to notify the taxpayer, in writing and with reasons, of their actions towards the 
taxpayer under the TPA. The notification under the TPA would allow the injured party to 
recognize indifference early so that they can act either through compliance or appeal.536  
In terms of feedback, it is advised that the system must have some post-dispute analysis 
mechanism which should help the parties learn from the dispute. The TAT and the courts are 
under a duty to provide reasons for the decisions they make. Furthermore, the decisions are 
released to the public through the National Reporting Council.537 This publication can help in 
identifying frequently occurring disputes that may be symptomatic of a broader systematic 
issue.538  
In terms of settlement of tax disputes under the Framework, paragraph 26.0 which provides for 
records and maintenance of data in ADR settlements merits discussion. The addition of this 
paragraph, especially paragraph 26. 0 (iii) under which the commissioner shall notify the 
Auditor General of any revenue forgone and give a justification, forms a post-dispute analysis 
forum. This provision is welcome in light of the fact that foregone taxes affect the public purse, 
and it is desirable that the feedback under this provision is comprehensive in light of Article 
10 (2) (c)539 and Article 210 (2) of the Constitution.540  
 Principle 5 – Arrange Procedures in A Low to High Cost Sequence 
After an assessment, once the taxpayer files their notice of objection, the ADR framework 
provides that the parties can engage ADR in the form of facilitated discussions. If the parties 
reach an agreement, the taxpayer either pays additional tax or the commissioner amends the 
assessment. If the parties fail to reach an agreement and the commissioner confirms the 
assessment, the taxpayer would have to appeal to the tax tribunal which is a rights contest. It 
                                                 
535 Geothermal Development Company Limited v Attorney General & 3 others [2013] eKLR. 
536 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 61. 
537 See; Legal Notice No. 29 of 2009. 
538 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 61. 
539 (2) “The national values and principles of governance include— (c) ... good governance, integrity, transparency 
and accountability…”. 
540 “If legislation permits the waiver of any tax or licensing fee— (a) a public record of each waiver shall be 
maintained together with the reason for the waiver; and (b) each waiver, and the reason for it, shall be reported to 
the Auditor- General.” 
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is expected that as the dispute graduates from an objection to an appeal the costs become higher 
in terms of money and time for example while in the tribunal representation by an advocate is 
not mandatory541, in the appeals to the courts, advocates are mandatory. Furthermore, due to 
the inflexibility of procedure, more time and energy may be expended at the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal level. Tax dispute procedures in Kenya are gradually sequenced from a 
low to a high-cost sequence.  
 Principle 6 – Provide the Necessary Motivation, Skills and Recourses To Use 
Them  
To make sure a system works, it must be provided with the necessary resources and the parties 
must be motivated to use it.542 Unfortunately, despite the benefits that accrue from having 
interest-based procedures as the primary and first option to resolve disputes, the statutory tax 
dispute framework does not fully embrace interest-based approaches to tax dispute resolution 
and thus it does not provide adequate resources in the form of rules, procedures and norms to 
back the use of interest based procedures. While granting an opportunity to parties to settle tax 
disputes out of court, Section 55 of TPA and section 28 of the TATA do not provide any 
guidance or context for out of court settlement that could motivate the parties to settle the 
matter outside of the court or tribunal. Furthermore, EACCMA does not offer any opportunities 
for settlement. The framing of these provisions does not provide any legal assistance to parties 
seeking to engage in out of court settlement.543 Furthermore, they are not framed in a manner 
that could adequately and legally sustain an interest-oriented dispute resolution system.544 
 Conclusion 
The evaluation conducted in this chapter indicates that Kenya’s tax dispute resolution does not 
follow many of the DSD principles set out by Ury Brett and Goldberg. The tax dispute statutory 
framework enshrined in the TPA, EACCMA, and TATA does not: create ways for reconciling 
the interests of the parties in dispute, have built in loop back procedures, and provide low-cost 
rights and power back-ups. Furthermore, the TPA, EACCMA, and TATA do not provide the 
necessary motivation, skills and resources for the use of interest-based approaches of dispute 
                                                 
541 Section 25 (1), Tax Appeals Tribunal Act (Act No. 40 of 2013). 
542 Ury W, Brett J and Goldberg S B, Getting disputes resolved, 18. 
543 Jones M, ‘Tax dispute systems design’, 40. 
544 Jones M, ‘Tax dispute systems design’, 40. 
 76 
resolution. The statutory tax dispute resolution system does possess robust procedures for 
notification and feedback, especially at the appeals level where the decisions are reported to 
the public. 
The ADR framework meets two DSD principles. The Framework creates ways for reconciling 
the interests of the parties in dispute despite the lack of early negotiation procedure. The ADR 
framework does have some form of loop-back to interest-based procedures; however, this is 
not a dispute resolution procedure in itself as contemplated by Ury, Brett and Goldberg. 
Furthermore, the Framework provide low cost rights procedure in the form of the TAT. The 
ADR framework benefits from the robust and mandatory notification procedures under the 
TPA. It was noted that the ADR Framework lacks a mechanism for post-dispute analysis.  
Arguably, one significant principle lacking in the Framework is whether the Framework itself 
encourages its use. Its non-binding nature and lack of express statutory backing does not 
enhance motivation for its use. As Ury, Brett and Goldberg remark: “Establishing mediation 












                                                 




CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the main research objectives, findings, and recommendations, of the 
study. The study sought to evaluate Kenya’s tax dispute resolution system through the DSD 
principles proposed by Ury, Brett, and Goldberg to identifying shortcomings in the design of 
the system that may hinder the resolution of tax disputes through less adversarial means. 
 Findings 
 Emergence of Tax Disputes 
Tax disputes develop when KRA identifies a possible misapplication of the law by the 
taxpayer. The commissioner then makes a ‘claim’ against the taxpayer for redress. If the 
taxpayer rejects the commissioner’s application of the law, a tax dispute arises. Tax disputes 
can thus be characterized as ‘PEALs’. For a taxpayer to prevail against the tax authority, the 
taxpayer must prove that the tax administrator has erroneously applied the law. Disputes that 
may have begun as ‘PEALs may become subsumed into disputes about PIE resulting in a need 
for vindication of rights or judicial review.  
In tax disputes, KRA has two main interests: to maximize revenue collection and enforce the 
law and to ensure voluntary compliance. These interests can be conceptualized as task-interests 
since they are related to KRA’s statutory mandate. Although the taxpayer’s interests maybe 
entangled and hard to discern, their interests can be said to fall into three broad categories; 
pragmatic self-interest, vindication of rights, and fair treatment.  
Chapter 2 concludes that taxpayer interests and KRA’s interests are not completely 
incompatible. For example, the need to ensure voluntary compliance is compatible with the 
taxpayers need for fair treatment as they interact with the tax administration. This means that 
interest-based approaches such as mediation and negotiation can be used to resolve tax disputes 
more comprehensively, and trade-offs can be made if such considerations can be made during 
tax dispute resolution.  
 Kenya’s Tax Dispute Resolution System  
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Tax disputes, being PEALs, are resolved through objections, reviews, and appeals provided for 
in the TPA, TATA, and EACCMA all of which provide for some form adversarial dispute 
resolution. section 55 of the TPA provides for ‘settlement out of court’; however, beyond 
giving a timeline within which the dispute may be determined, section 55 of the TPA gives no 
context, guidance or rules on how the parties are to settle out of court. Section 28 of TATA 
creates a mandatory obligation on the TATA to allow the parties to settle out of court and then 
gives them a discretionary power to settle the dispute subject to conditions it may impose. 
section 55 of the TPA, the other provision providing for out of court settlement, is drafted in 
broader terms and does not seem to empower the court to impose conditions on the out of court 
settlement. There are doubts as to whether section 55 of the TPA and section 28 of TATA 
underpin KRA’s ADR framework, granting it legal status. Regardless, the framework does 
provide an avenue for interest-based dispute resolution.  
 DSD Evaluation of Kenya’s Tax Dispute Resolution System 
Chapter 5 of this paper formed the crux of the study. Kenya’s tax dispute resolution system, as 
provided for in the TPA, TATA, EACCMA and KRA’s ADR framework, was evaluated 
against the DSD principles espoused in the Ury, Brett Goldberg Model which provide for the 
effective and efficient design of interest-oriented dispute resolution system. Overall, Kenya’s 
tax dispute resolution system does not meet four of the DSD principles including the most 
critical one that demands that ways of reconciling the parties’ interest are established. Kenya’s 
tax dispute resolution system, as a whole, substantially meets only two of the principles: it has 
built-in procedures for notification and consultation and dispute resolution procedures are 
arranged in a low to a high- cost sequence.  
Since it has not met the DSD principles set out by Ury, Brett and Goldberg, one can reasonably 
argue that Kenya’s tax dispute system is not yet oriented towards resolving disputes through 
interest-based approaches which tend to result in lower transaction costs, greater satisfaction 
with outcomes, and less recurrence of disputes. In light of the above, the following 
recommendations can be made towards orienting the system towards resolving a majority of 




The author recommends that the TPA, as the primary procedural tax law, should explicitly 
provide for ways for parties in a tax dispute to reconcile their interests. In addition to section 
55 of the TPA which provides for out of court settlement, there is a need for the following 
provisions within the TPA which would embrace the six DSD principles of an effective dispute 
resolution system:  
1. A specific section in the Act empowering KRA to settle a tax dispute on a compromise 
basis where it is in the best interest of the state. This provision should allow and grant 
KRA the flexibility to temper the principle that they cannot forgo taxes that are payable 
after conducting a cost-benefit analysis and considering the uncertainties of litigation. 
In deciding whether or not it is appropriate to settle in the best interest of the state, the 
following must be taken into account: whether the ‘settlement’ is in the best interest of 
good management of the tax system, the cost of litigation, complex factual issues that 
may make the resolution of disputes unsuitable for the courts and whether settlement is 
a cost effective way to promote compliance.  
2. Rules governing the use of ADR procedures pursuant to which KRA and the person 
aggrieved by an assessment or ‘decision’ may resolve a dispute. More specifically, clear 
negotiation procedures first then facilitated discussions procedures if the negotiations 
prove unsuccessful. The appeal procedures currently in the TPA would remain as rights 
backups. It is important that these rules be made with consultation with the judiciary to 
ensure compatibility with the justice system. Furthermore, in the formulation of the 
rules, stakeholders such as taxpayers, tax advisers, and the Attorney General should 
also be consulted. The involvement of stakeholders is essential since it will enhance the 
legitimacy and credibility of the rules which will then motivate the use of the rules.  
3. Further, on the rules for settlement, the procedure ought to set out: which officers have 
the authority to negotiate on behalf of the commissioner, the timelines within which 
ADR processes must be undertaken, who can assist the parties to reach settlement if 
negotiations between them seem to be failing, and how the Commissioner may alter or 
amend their decision on settlement. These procedures rules would ensure that there is 
certainty which creates legitimate expectations of fairness in the process which, in turn, 
motivates the use of interest-based approaches.   
4. For proper post-dispute analysis, there should be a provision for a register of settlements 
and methods for reporting of settlements reached between KRA and the taxpayer. This 
reporting will create a statutory obligation for which KRA can be held accountable 
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unlike the current one contained in the non-binding internal ADR Framework. The 
proposed register would maintain a record of all disputes settled under ADR procedures 
and document the process by which each dispute was settled. Furthermore, the 
Commissioner should provide a summary of settlements to the Minister in charge of 
national finance and the Auditor General in format that does not reveal the taxpayer but 
contains details of the number of settlements, the class of taxpayers and the estimated 
gains and savings of engaging in ADR in terms of time and money not spent litigating 
disputes.  The mandatory obligation under this provision based on article 210 (2) (a) 
(b) of the Constitution would ensure accountability which would enhance motivation 
for the use of ADR procedures to resolve tax disputes.  
5. The provisions for out of court settlement as currently provided should be maintained; 
however, the following improvements should be made. If there were no ADR 
discussions before the appeal was filed, the parties should indicate, in their notice of 
intention to appeal, whether they would like to engage in ADR in the first instance 
before the tribunal hears the appeal. It should be clear that the out of court settlement 
process, either at the tribunal stage or at the judicial stage, will be subject to the rules 
created under the TPA. If the ADR proceedings are not successful, the matter would 
then be fixed for hearing; this would effectively make the hearing of the tribunal a 
“back-up”. A loop-back mechanism should also be put in place where the parties had 
engaged in ADR before the appeal at the objection stage, the court or tribunal may 
allow the parties to loop back to the ADR procedure subject to certain deliberation such 
as whether the loop back is reasonable or whether it will cause delay.  
6. Two opportunities to engage in the ADR procedure. The first would be at the objection 
stage before the Commissioner confirms the assessment. The second one at the appeals 
stage. This would ensure that the ADR process has multiple entry points.  
In terms of KRA’s ADR Framework, instead of anchoring it in the tax statute, it is 
recommended that the Framework be scrapped in favour of rules and procedures created in the 
TPA. Legislating the use of ADR in tax dispute resolution as recommended above would be 
the best way to show commitment towards having a majority of tax dispute being resolved by 
less adversarial means of dispute resolution.  
 Conclusion 
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In light of the objectives, statement of the problem, hypotheses, and theoretical framework, the 
study has achieved its intended objectives and addressed the statement of the problem. The 
objectives of the study were to:  
1. To critically evaluate the design of Kenya’s tax dispute resolution system through the 
lens of the principles proposed by Ury, Brett and Goldberg. 
2. To make recommendations that address the identified shortcomings and improve the 
design of the tax dispute system to make it more interest-based.  
 
Objective 1:  
The author has critically evaluated the design of Kenya’s tax dispute resolution system through 
the lens of the principles proposed by Ury, Brett and Goldberg. The analysis in chapter 5 
identified several short comings that preclude the dispute system from being interest-oriented. 
This objective has been met.  
Objective 2: 
The author has made recommendations that address the identified shortcomings and would 
improve the design of the tax dispute system to make it more interest oriented. The study 
recommends the addition of several provisions in the TPA providing for: compromise 
settlement of tax disputes, rules governing the use of ADR procedures, provision for a register 
of settlements and methods of reporting of settlements reached between KRA and the taxpayer, 
and mechanisms allowing the parties to loop-back to ADR procedures at the appeal level.  
This objective has been met.  
The statement of the problem was that despite the provisions in the TPA and TATA providing 
for out of court settlement, KRA’s ADR framework, and KRA’s desire to employ ADR in tax 
dispute resolution, a majority of tax disputes are still resolved through litigation. 
Recommendations have been made, based on the principles by Ury, Brett and Goldberg, to 
make the system more oriented towards the interest of the parties. The study was premised on 
the hypothesis that:  
1. Kenya’s tax dispute resolution system is not designed to resolve a majority of tax 
disputes through less adversarial dispute resolution procedures such as settlement, 
negotiation and facilitated discussions thus hindering the system’s main objectives of 
providing fair, timely, and cost-effective dispute resolution. 
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2. Amending the TPA to provide for: compromise settlement of tax disputes, rules 
governing the use of ADR procedures, provision for a register of settlements and 
methods of reporting of settlements reached between KRA and the taxpayer, and 
mechanisms allowing the parties to loop-back to ADR procedures at the appeal level, 
based on the principles by Ury, Brett and Goldberg, would make the tax dispute system 
more oriented towards less adversarial dispute resolution. 
 
Hypothesis 1  
The study has tested this hypothesis by showing that the current system is not designed to 
resolve a majority of tax disputes through less adversarial dispute resolution procedures such 
as settlement, negotiation and facilitated discussions. This failure is because the TPA, 
EACCMA, and the TATA mostly provide for adversarial dispute resolution mechanisms. Even 
where the Act does provide an avenue for out of court or tribunal settlement, it does not create 
ways for parties to reconcile their interest, there are no procedures to loop-back to less 
adversarial means of dispute resolution, the system does not provide for ADR as the main form 
of dispute resolution, and the system does not provide resources in terms of rules and norms 
for disputes to be resolved through interest-based methods.  
Hypothesis 2  
This hypothesis has been proven since the addition of compromise settlements of tax disputes, 
rules governing the use of ADR procedures, provisions for a register of settlements and 
methods of reporting of settlements reached between KRA and the taxpayer, and mechanisms 
allowing the parties to loop-back to ADR procedures at the appeal level would align Kenya’s 
tax dispute system towards the Ury, Brett, and Goldberg model and would make Kenya’s tax 
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